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Product Data Management (PDM) systems support the product/document management of
design processes such as those typically used in the manufacturing industry. They allow
enterprises to capture, organise, automate and share engineering information in an efﬁ-
cient way. The efﬁcient handling of queries on product information and the uploading and
downloading of families of related ﬁles for modiﬁcation by designers are essential aspects
of such systems. The efﬁciency of the system as perceived by its clients depends on its
correct functioning, but also for a signiﬁcant part on its performance aspects. In this article,
we apply both qualitative and stochastic model-checking techniques to evaluate various
usability and performance aspects of the thinkteam PDM system, and of several proposed
extensions, thereby assisting the design phase of an industrial groupware system.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Product Life-cycleManagement (PLM) is the activity ofmanaging a company’s products across their life-cycles—from their
conception, through design and manufacturing, to service and disposal—in the most effective way [1]. think3’s thinkPLM is a
suite of integrated PLM applications, built on thinkteam. thinkteam is think3’s Product Data Management (PDM) application,
catering the product/document management needs of design processes in the manufacturing industry. It allows enterprises
to capture, organise, automate and share engineering information in an efﬁcient way. thinkteam is used to manage data
for products/documents undergoing constant changes as well as for occasional customisations, i.e. with long or short life-
cycles. The current thinkteam setting consists of a number of clients that interact with one centralised Relational Data Base
Management System (RDBMS) server. This RDBMS controls the storage and retrieval of data, such as Computer-Aided Design
(CAD) ﬁles in a ﬁle-system-like repository, called the Vault. Access control is based on a ‘retrial’ principle: There is no queue
(or reservation system) handling the client’s requests for editing rights on a ﬁle.
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thinkteam is a typical example of a groupware system, i.e. a multi-user computer system meant to assist people col-
laborating on a common project. Such systems are studied in the interdisciplinary research ﬁeld of Computer Supported
CooperativeWork (CSCW),whichdealswith theunderstandingofhowpeoplework together, and theways inwhichcomputer
technology can assist them [2]. Groupware is typically classiﬁed according to two dichotomies, viz. (1) whether its users
work together at the same time (synchronous) or at different times (asynchronous) and (2) whether they work together
in the same place (co-located) or in different places (dispersed). This is called the time space taxonomy by Ellis et al. [3].
thinkteam is an asynchronous and dispersed groupware system. Among the important design issues in groupware systems
are data sharing, concurrency control and user awareness, where the latter should be understood as users having a sense of
the (past, current, future) activities of other users—without direct communication—and using this as context for their own
activities [4,5].
In this article, we address these and other issues in the context of thinkteam. More precisely, we use model checking
to formalise and verify several design options for thinkteam extensions. However, we also apply model checking to verify
a number of properties speciﬁcally of interest for the correctness of groupware protocols in general, i.e. not limited to the
context of thinkteam. Recent years have seen an increasing interest in the use of model checking for the formal veriﬁcation
of (properties of) groupware [6,7,8] and publish/subscribe (pub/sub) systems [9,10,11,12]. In a pub/sub system, clients may
publishﬁles ina repositoryandsubscribe themselves toautomatically receivenotiﬁcationsonchanges toﬁlesof their interest.
One of the difﬁculties in this domain is that detailed models tend to generate very large state spaces due to the interleaving
activity that comes with many asynchronously operating clients [11,13]. Our approach to use model-checking techniques
in the groupware domain differs from these approaches. We generate small, abstract models that are intended to address
speciﬁc usability-related groupware issues.We show thatmodel checking can be of great help in an exploratory design phase,
both for comparing different design options and for reﬁning and improving the description of the proposed extensions. This
way of usingmodel checking is in support of a prototyping-likemodelling technique. The focus is on obtaining in a relatively
fast way an informed but perhaps somewhat approximative idea of the consequences, both qualitative and quantitative, of
adding speciﬁc features to an existing groupware system. This is quite different from the traditional use of model checking
as a technique to develop rather complete speciﬁcations, with the aim of reaching a maximal level of conﬁdence in the
correctness of complicateddistributed algorithms. In this sense, our proposeduse ofmodel checking is somewhat resembling
the idea of extreme programming [14]: Generating simple ad-hoc models of new features that are meant to be added to a
system.
The work presented in this article is partly based on our previous publications on the application of model checking
to the design of groupware systems, which we now brieﬂy describe in chronological order. In [6], we have developed a
rather abstract speciﬁcation of that part of the protocol underlying the groupware toolkit Clock [15,16] that deals with
concurrency and exclusive editing rights. In the same work we show, using the model checker Spin [17], that our spec-
iﬁcation satisﬁes a number of correctness properties, some of which were also mentioned in the work by Urnes [8] on
Clock.
In [18,19], we have used the same model-checking technique to formalise and verify some concurrency and usability as-
pects of thinkteam, andof aﬁrstproposedextensionof thinkteamwitha lightweight andeasy-to-usepub/subeventnotiﬁcation
service. This service is intended to increase the users’ awareness of the status of the development of the engineering product
and the activities of the design team by intelligent data sharing. Whenever a thinkteam client publishes a ﬁle by importing it
into theVault, i.e. the relevantﬁle repository, automatically all clients that are subscribed to thatﬁle arenotiﬁedvia amulticast
communication. We have analysed a number of qualitative correctness properties addressing concurrency, usability and
awareness aspects. Pub/sub event notiﬁcation de-couples the communication among users: A user publishing a document
need not be concernedwithwhom the serverwill send a notiﬁcation to, i.e. the users communicate through the server. Users
neednot actively participate in thenotiﬁcation in a synchronousway. In fact, themain strengthof a pub/sub event notiﬁcation
service is said to be the “full de-coupling of the communicating participants in time, space and ﬂow” [20]. The main results
of the analyses of the pub/sub notiﬁcation service are reported in Section 4. A related approach can be found in [21], where a
case study in the automatic derivation of correct integration code for assembling a set of thinkteam’s (software) components is
reported.
Some usability issues, inﬂuenced more by the performance of a system than by its functional behaviour, cannot be
analysed by qualitative model-checking techniques alone. In fact, we showed in [18,19] that the system is not starvation
free, i.e. a client can be excluded from obtaining a ﬁle, simply because other clients competing for the same ﬁle are
more ‘lucky’ in their attempts to obtain it. Such behaviour can be explained by the fact that clients are only provided
with a ﬁle-access mechanism based on a ‘retrial’ principle. While analysis with qualitative model checking can be used
to show that such a problem exists, it cannot be used to quantify the effect that it has on usability. In our case, the
number of retries a client has to perform before obtaining a ﬁle is an important measure of the usability of the system.
If this number is high, extending thinkteam with a waiting-list policy should be considered instead of the current sim-
pler retry-based policy. The trade-off between these two design options was analysed in [22], where we used stochastic
model-checking techniques. The main issues and results of such analysis experiments are reported in the present ar-
ticle in Section 5. Stochastic model checking is a relatively recent extension of qualitative model checking that allows
for the analysis of qualitative properties of systems as well as performance- and dependability-related, i.e. quantitative,
properties [23,24,25,26].
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The original contribution of the present paper is presented in Section 6, where we use the same technique to model and
analyse a new extension of thinkteam, concerning the replacement of the unique centralised Vault by a distributed set of
replicated vaults and a preference list for vaults per client. The assignment of a suitable vault location has an effect on the
performance of the system and therefore on the adequacy of the support it can provide to its clients. The properties we verify
include the guarantee that ﬁles are modiﬁed by at most one client at a time, the expected waiting time for clients requesting
a ﬁle for modiﬁcation, the effect of workload conditions on the usability of the system and on the overhead in uploading and
downloading ﬁles.
An important topic addressed in this article concerns the uptake ofmodel-checking techniques by industry. Our industrial
partner think3 had no previous experience with such analysis techniques. We show that our approach to start from small
models that require little time to fully understand, but that nevertheless provide results that would be unfeasible to produce
manually, and that can be used to generate performance diagrams directly related to issues of interest to the industry, can
be successfully transferred to industry.
We begin this article with a description of thinkteam in Section 2, followed by a brief introduction to qualitative and
stochastic model checking in Section 3. In Section 4, we present the analysis of the extension of thinkteam with a pub/sub
event notiﬁcation service. Subsequently, in Section 5, we present a stochastic model for the quantitative analysis of two
different ﬁle access policies. In Section 6, we enrich the model of Section 5 to analyse thinkteam extended with multiple
replicated vaults; the resulting model and analysis are the original contribution of the paper. Finally, we brieﬂy describe the
lessons learned from our experience with the use of qualitative and quantitative model checking in an industrial groupware
setting in Section 7, and we draw some conclusions and give an outline of future work in Section 8.
2. Thinkteam
In this section, we present a brief overview of think3’s PDM application thinkteam. For more information, we refer the
reader to http://www.think3.com.
The design process in the manufacturing industry involves a vast number of activities. Product design is the most cre-
ative, but not necessarily the costliest or the most resource intensive activity in terms of human, ﬁnancial and material
resources. Among the several non-design tasks that are required for the delivery of a ﬁnal product to an enterprise’s
Manufacturing department, some are externally initiated by organisations such as the Sales or the Marketing depart-
ments, or by requests and orders of individual customers (most often for companies working on order). Other tasks are
initiated by the design ofﬁce itself and require co-operation from suppliers, the Manufacturing department and external
consultants.
Design and non-design activities produce and consume information—both documental (CAD drawings, models and
manuals) and non-documental (Bill Of Materials (BOM), reports and workﬂow trails). It is the composition of this infor-
mation that eventually activates the process that produces a physical object. Information mismanagement can, and often
does, have direct impact on the cost structure of the manufacturing phase: For instance, having different part numbers
for interchangeable items (a common mishap) causes unnecessary inventory bloat and increases the associated costs. An
important part of the work of the design ofﬁce goes into maintaining and updating projects that have been previously
released: A historical view of the previous information is absolutely necessary for this. This is where PDM applications come
into play.
Client
RDBMSVault
Client Client
Client
Fig. 1. The thinkteam structure. Document checkIn/Out is represented by dotted arrows; metadata operations are represented by solid ones.
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Since the inception of PDM as a separate IT discipline, a few clear goals have been deemed a non-negotiable part of any
successful implementation, viz.
• it must make signiﬁcant contributions to the reduction of the overall conception/design/development cycle,
• It must supply a coherent and up-to-date view of the information,
• it must preserve the historical evolution of the information and of the events and actors that have affected it (trace-
ability), and
• it must provide easy and secure access to all of the product-related information, both documental (vaulting) and
non-documental (metadata).
To a large extent, thinkteam meets these goals. As such it supports the whole product development life-cycle, bringing the
right information to the right people at the right time. However, several extensions are currently proposed to further improve
thinkteam, in particular its performance from the user’s point of viewwhen larger groups of CADdesigners are using thinkteam
in an ever more geographically distributed and potentially service-oriented way.
As we mentioned in Section 1, thinkteam is an asynchronous and dispersed groupware system. An additional difﬁculty
that arises during the design of such groupware is their inherently distributed nature. This forces one to address issues like
network communication, concurrency control and distributed notiﬁcation. This has lead to the development of groupware
toolkits that aid groupware developers with a series of programming abstractions aimed at simplifying the development
of groupware applications. Examples include Rendezvous [27], GroupKit [28] and Clock [15,16]. In this article, we address a
complementary approach to the design of the underlying protocols of such systems and their performance characteristics
from a user’s point of view.
2.1. Technical characteristics
Thinkteam is a three-tier data management system running on Wintel platforms (cf. also Fig. 1). The most typical
installation scenario is a network of several desktop clients interacting with one centralised RDBMS server and one or
more ﬁle servers grouped into a single Vault. In this setting, components resident on each client node supply a graphical
interface, metadata management and integration services. Persistence services are achieved by building on the charac-
teristics of the RDBMS and ﬁle servers. The dotted arrows in Fig. 1 denote document checkIn and checkOut, while solid
arrows represent metadata operations. The internal communication between the Vault and the RDBMS are not explic-
itly presented in the ﬁgure. Below follows a general description of the operations of various (logical) thinkteam subsys-
tems.
2.1.1. RDBMS Interaction
Thinkteam uses a RDBMS to persist and retrieve both its object model and the objects that are created during operation.
RDBMS interactions are fairly low level in nature and are completely transparent to end users.
2.1.2. Vaulting
The controlled storage and retrieval of document data in PDMapplications is traditionally called vaulting, where the Vault
is a ﬁle-system-like repository. The two main functions of vaulting are:
• toprovide a single, secure andcontrolled storage environmentwhere thedocuments controlledby thePDMapplication
are managed, and
• to prevent inconsistent updates or changes to the document base, while still allowing the maximal access that is
compatible with the business rules.
While the former is the subject of the implementation of the lower layers of the vaulting system, the latter is implemented
in thinkteam’s underlying protocol by a standard set of operations made available to the clients, viz. those listed in Table 1. It
is important to note that access to ﬁles (through the above checkOut operation) is based on a ‘retrial’ principle: There is no
queue (or reservation system) handling the requests for editing rights on a ﬁle.
Table 1
thinkteam user operations.
Operation Effect
get Extract a read-only copy of a ﬁle from the Vault
import Insert an external ﬁle into the Vault
checkOut
Extract a copy of a ﬁle from the Vault with the intent of modifying it (exclusive, i.e. only one
checkout at a time is possible)
unCheckOut Cancel the effects of a preceding checkout
checkIn Replace an edited ﬁle in the Vault (the ﬁle must previously have been checked out)
checkInOut Replace an edited ﬁle in the Vault, while at the same time retaining it as checked out
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2.2. Thinkteam at work
Thinkteam supports CAD designers in various design phases. An important area of thinkteam intervention is the overall
industrialisationpart of a givenproject and involves activities that tend tobe intensivew.r.t. theproject’smetadata (attributes,
BOM structure) while being light on the documentmanagement (and therefore vaulting) side. Vaulting capabilities aremost
frequently used—by a CAD designer—during the modelling phases, brieﬂy described next.
2.2.1. Geometry information retrieval
The most usual design work in the manufacturing industry (thinkteam’s prime target) involves the production of compo-
nents that are part ofmore complex goods. TheCADmodels describing these products are called assemblies and are structured
as composite documents referring to several (sometimes hundreds or thousands) individualmodel ﬁles. In this situation,most
of the geometry data a designer dealswith consists of referencematerial, i.e. parts surrounding the component she is actually
creating or modifying. The designer needs to interact with this referencematerial in order to position, adapt andmate to the
assembly the part she is working with.
Most of the reference parts are normally production items subjected to PDM management and whose physical counter-
parts (model ﬁles) reside in the Vault. The logical operation by which the designer gains access to them is the get operation
discussed above,which is performed automatically. This is the type of activity that happensmost often andwhich is normally
involved in all other activities listed below, aswell as inmany others not explicitlymentioned (such as visualisation, printing,
etc.).
2.2.2. Geometry (part) modiﬁcation
Modifying an existing part is, in order of frequency, the second-most-used operation a designer performs during her
activity. Given that the part already exists (i.e. it is already in the Vault) the designer must express the intent to modify it
with an explicit (write exclusive) checkOut operation that prevents attempts at modiﬁcation by other users. A screen-shot of
the invocation of this operation in the Graphical User Interface (GUI) is depicted in Fig. 2.
When designers are ready to publish their work, they will release it to the system by issuing an explicit checkIn com-
mand, which frees the model for modiﬁcation. Were the designers to change their mind, then they might choose to
issue an unCheckOut command, which frees the model but discards any changes that have occurred since the check-
Out. Finally, they may issue a checkInOut if they want to release an intermediate version of the model to the system,
but do not yet want to release it for further modiﬁcations by others. All these actions require explicit action on the
part of the user and are exposed via suitable parts of thinkteam’s GUI. Note that when a ﬁle has been checked out, but
before it has been checked in, the ﬁle can still be accessed by other designers in read-only mode, by means of get
operations.
Fig. 2. A thinkteam user checks out a ﬁle from the Vault.
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view
notify
request
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notify
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Model
Fig. 3. The MVC architecture and its communication protocol.
2.2.3. Geometry (part) creation
Lastly, a designermay create a completely newcomponent and insert it into the system. As the partwill initially be created
outside the system Vault, an import operation is required to register it with thinkteam. In this case, the special environment
Save Into Project (SIP) is provided, combining metadata/vaulting operations to speedily register changes and modiﬁcations.
2.3. Architecture
Thinkteam’s design-level architecture is based on the Model-View-Controller (MVC) paradigm of [29]. According to this
paradigm, an architecture organising interactive applications is partitioned into three separate parts, viz.
• the Model, implementing the application’s data state and semantics,
• the View, computing the graphical output of the application, and
• the Controller, interpreting the inputs from the users.
In Fig. 3, the MVC architecture is depicted together with its communication protocol. The Controller transforms an input
from the User, e.g. a checkOut request, into an update, which it sends to the Model. In order to do so, it may need to obtain
data from the Model, e.g. whether the requested ﬁle is locked, by communicating via request and response. Upon receiving
an update, the Model changes its data state and sends a notify to both the Controller and the View. The latter, upon receiving
this notify, re-computes the display—for which it may need to obtain the new data state from the Model by communicating
again via request and response—and eventually sends a view to the User.
In thinkteam’s design-level architecture, the Model and the Controller are integrated and situated on the server, while
a View is situated on each of the clients. The communication between the server and the clients is deﬁned by a set of
(communication) protocols.
2.4. Characteristics of use
Thinkteam handles something like a few hundred thousand ﬁles for some 20–100 users. In order to get more realistic
data on the particular use that clients make of the system, think3 has provided us with a cleaned-up log-ﬁle, comprising
all activity (in terms of the operations listed in Table 1) of one of the manufacturing industries using thinkteam from 2002
through 2006, for us to analyse. This log-ﬁle contains, for each operation, its time stamp (in the format day-month-year and
hour-minute-second), the name of the user that performed it and the ﬁle the operation refers to. In this way, each line in
the log-ﬁle represents an atomic access to the Vault. The format of the log-ﬁle is easy to handle, but it contains a really huge
amount of data (792, 618 Vault accesses by 104 users regarding 183, 492 ﬁles). Moreover, think3 has improved its logging
mechanism during the years. For these reasons, we have restricted our analysis to the year 2006. The aim of our analysis was
to obtain some insight on the timing issues concerning the duration of editing sessions and the occupancy of ﬁles.
The data of 2006 concerns 83 users collaborating on a total of 181, 535 ﬁles, 23, 134 of which were checked out at least
once during the year. The remaining ﬁles were used exclusively as reference material, e.g. downloaded in read-only fashion
by means of get operations. A total of 65 users turned out to be involved in editing sessions. We present the analysis of
a subset of the data that is directly relevant for the models that will be presented in Sections 5 and 6. These concern the
duration of editing sessions (i.e. the time that has passed between a checkOut and a checkIn of a ﬁle by the same user) and
the duration of periods in which ﬁles were not locked (i.e. the time that has passed between a checkIn and a checkOut of the
same ﬁle by possibly different users). Instead, the number of times that a user unsuccessfully tries to checkOut a locked ﬁle
(i.e. checked out by another user) has not been explicitly logged, so little can be said about that. However, it is possible to
obtain an indirect approximation of the number of users that compete for access to the same ﬁle by analysing the number
of users that modify the same ﬁle during the investigated period.
In Fig. 4, we present the data that we obtained after a series of operations performed on the log-ﬁle to ﬁlter out the
logging of irrelevant operations such as the numerous get operations (recall that this is themost-frequently-used operation),
operations that could be traced back to system administrator interventions and some further anomalous log operations.
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Fig. 4. (a) and (b) Histograms of the log-ﬁle analyses reported in this section.
Table 2
Number of ﬁles edited by at least two users.
Nr.ﬁles 5077 1407 301 79 24 22 8 8 6 10 3 1 1 1
Nr.users 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 17
These graphs have been produced with SPSS v15.0 [30] by computing the so-called mean trimmed 40% (i.e. discarding the
lower and higher 20% of the scores and taking the mean of the remaining scores).
Fig. 4a shows a histogram of the distribution of the duration of editing sessions. On the x-axis, the time is presented
in seconds. The histogram thus shows all sessions except for 20% of the shortest and 20% of the longest sessions, meaning
that sessions of less than 111 s (i.e. approximately 2 min) and more than 22, 256 s (i.e. approximately 370 min) have been
removed. This has beendonebecause the log-ﬁle containedmanyvery short sessions thatwerenot corresponding to real user
editing sessions, but rather to automatic system operations that were also logged and that feature in the log-ﬁle as very short
checkOut-checkIn sessions.We see that themeanduration trimmed40% of an edit session is 2, 657 s, so approximately 45min.
It is easy to see that most sessions tend to be rather short.
In Fig. 4b a histogram is shown of the duration of intervals during which ﬁles, that were involved in at least two editing
sessions, were not locked (i.e. taken in checkOut). These data give an impression of the time that passes between Vault
accesses to the same ﬁle by possibly different users. Each bar in this histogram corresponds to a duration of about 17 h. Many
of the intervals fall into the ﬁrst few periods, indicating that there aremany cases in which ﬁles were used rather intensively.
Finally, Table 2 shows the number of ﬁles that were edited by more than one user in 2006. A further analysis of these
ﬁles shows that it is quite common that multiple users are editing the same ﬁle on the same day, and that there are also
days in which upto 8 users are accessing the same ﬁle on the same day or on adjacent days. We are aware of the fact that
the log analysis is only covering one year of data collected at one particular client, and may therefore not be completely
representative of a typical thinkteam user. However, the log data are real observations and do provide information on an
example of actual use of the system which can help to put modelling results into the proper perspective.
3. Modelling and analysis techniques
Traditional software-engineering methods like testing and simulation alone, would be quite time consuming and not
very suitable to provide the information needed to design the thinkteam extensions we mentioned in Section 1. The main
reason for this is that the concurrency aspects of groupware system like thinkteam (with users located in geographically
distributed places that collaborate in an asynchronous but co-ordinatedway) play amajor role in the important design issues
for such systems (data sharing, user awareness and concurrency control to guarantee mutually exclusive ﬁle modiﬁcation
rights). Formal methods supported by tools, such as model checkers, would in principle be more suitable, even though their
application in the groupware domain has not been very widespread.
Model checking is an automatic technique which can be used to verify whether a system design satisﬁes its requirements
speciﬁcation [31]. Such a veriﬁcation is moreover exhaustive, i.e. all possible input combinations and states are taken into
account. One of the few early attempts at using model-checking techniques in the groupware domain, e.g. to model and
analyse theprotocols underlyingClock [15,16],were not very encouragingdue to the generation of a huge state space. To avoid
running out of memory due to such a state-space explosion—which would make an exhaustive veriﬁcation unfeasible—it is
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necessary to usemore abstractmodels, which capture only the core of the systemdesignwhile abstracting fromunnecessary
details. As said before, this is the approach we follow in this article.
Wewill use twomodel-checking techniques. One technique has been speciﬁcally designed to deal with large state spaces
and is suitable for the analysis of qualitative (correctness) properties, providing also counterexamples in the form ofmessage
sequence charts. The other technique has been speciﬁcally designed for the analysis of quantitative aspects of a system
that may provide information on its expected usability. From an industrial point of view, both aspects are often closely
related and both may provide necessary complementary information on the system under design. We brieﬂy describe both
model-checking techniques in the next sections.
3.1. Qualitative model checking
One of the best known and most successful qualitative model checkers is Spin, which was developed at Bell Labs during
the last two decades [17]. It offers a spectrum of veriﬁcation techniques, ranging from partial to exhaustive veriﬁcation. It is
freely available through spinroot.com and it is very well documented. Apart from these obvious advantages we have chosen
to use Spin because of the aforementioned earlier attempt at verifying a simpliﬁed version of the Clock protocol with Spin
in [8], which moreover provides a complete speciﬁcation of the Clock protocol in Spin’s input language Promela.
Promela is a non-deterministic C-like speciﬁcation language for modelling ﬁnite-state systems communicating through
channels [17]. Formally, speciﬁcations in Promela are built from processes, data objects and message channels. Processes
are the active components of the system, while the data objects are its local and global variables. Message channels are used
to transmit data between processes. They can be local or global. Each channel is characterised by the type of messages which
can be sent/received via the channel and by its length. Channels with non-zero length are used to model asynchronous
communication and behave like FIFO buffers, while zero-length ones model synchronous communication (rendezvous). For
further details we refer the reader to [17]. Promela speciﬁcations can be given as input to Spin, together with a request to
verify certain correctness properties. Spin then converts the Promela processes into ﬁnite-state automata and on the ﬂy
creates and traverses the state space of a product automaton over these ﬁnite-state automata, in order to verify the speciﬁed
correctness properties. Spin can be used to verify both safety and liveness properties. Intuitively, a safety property asserts
that “nothing bad happens”; examples of safety properties are absence of deadlock or mutual exclusion. On the other hand,
a liveness property is one which asserts that “something good” will eventually happen; examples of liveness properties are
absence of individual starvation or responsiveness [32,17].
There are several ways of formalising correctness properties in Promela, the following two of which we shall use in this
article. First, basic assertionsmay be added to a Promela speciﬁcation. Subsequently, their validity can be veriﬁed by running
Spin. For instance, consider that wewant to be sure that a ﬁle is not locked themoment in which a lock request for that ﬁle is
going to be granted. Consider moreover that there is a boolean variable writeLock, which is true every time a lock request is
granted. Then the basic assertion assert(writeLock == false) can be added to the Promela speciﬁcation just before a lock
is granted and Spin can be used to verify whether there are assertion violations. If an assertion is violated, a counterexample
is automatically generated.
Spin accepts Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulae as requirement speciﬁcations to be checked over Promelamodels. The
syntax for LTL formulas which we will use in the present paper is given below1:
 ::= a | ¬ |  ∨  |  U
Atomic propositions a include true and user-deﬁned properties expressed in a C-like notation. Moreover, the special propo-
sition P[n]@label can be used, where label is a label introduced in the Promelamodel andmarks a speciﬁc point in process
P. The proposition holds in every state of the model where P is at point label. Index n is the process identiﬁer and it is
useful for distinguishing different instances of the same process(type) active in a system model. The way Spin assigns such
an identiﬁer is rather rigid and often makes formulae not so easy to understand. Consequently in the body of the paper we
use the simpliﬁed notation P@label and, when there are different instances of P to be taken into consideration we just use
the notational convention P0, P1, etc. Negation (¬) and disjunction (∨) are standard and can be combined in the usual way
in order to get other logical connectives, like conjunction (∧), implication (−> ), equivalence (<−> ). Given a system run,
i.e. a sequence σ of states from the behaviour of a system, the formula 1 U2 holds if there exists a state in σ where the
formula 2 holds and the formula 1 holds in the states of σ until 2 holds. Formula  (, respectively) abbreviates
true U (¬¬, respectively). For a more detailed and formal introduction on LTL, we refer the reader to [17,33].
3.2. Quantitative model checking
In the past, functional and performance analysis of systems were considered two separate areas of research and practice.
The latest developments in model checking, extending system veriﬁcation to performance and dependability aspects, have
1 The actual syntax accepted by Spin is slightly different. For the sake of readability, in the body of the present paper we prefer to use standard LTL syntax
(while in Appendix A canonical SPIN syntax is used).
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led to integrated qualitative and quantitative analysis techniques, even if the very useful generation of counterexamples for
such model checkers is still under development [34].
In this article, we use the probabilistic symbolic model checker PRISM [25,35] which supports, among others, the veriﬁ-
cation of Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL) properties over Continuous TimeMarkov Chains (CTMCs) [36]. These CTMCs can
be generated by high-level description languages, among which the Performance Evaluation Process Algebra PEPA [37], for
which PRISM provides a front end which translates PEPA speciﬁcations into PRISM native language descriptions. The PRISM
modelling language is a simple state-based language based on the Reactive Modules formalism of Alur and Henzinger [38].
A CTMC is automatically generated by PRISM from a system model description in the native language. PRISM checks the
satisfaction of CSL properties for given states in the given model and provides feedback on the calculated probabilities of
such states where appropriate. It uses symbolic data structures (i.e. variants of Binary Decision Diagrams).
Thebranching-time temporal logic CSL [39,40] is a stochastic variant of thewell-knownComputational Tree Logic CTL [41].
Let I be an interval on the real line, let p be a probability value and let  be a comparison operator, i.e.  ∈ {<,≤,≥,>}. The
syntax and informal semantics of CSL are given in the table below:
State formulae
 ::= a | ¬ |  ∨  | Sp () | Pp (ϕ)
Sp () : probability that  holds in steady state is  p
Pp (ϕ) : probability that a path fulﬁls ϕ is  p
Path formulae
ϕ ::= XI  | U I 
XI  : next state is reached at time t ∈ I and fulﬁls 
U I  :  holds along path until  holds at t ∈ I
The meaning of atomic propositions (a), negation (¬) and disjunction (∨) is standard. Using these operators, other boolean
operators can be deﬁned in the usual way. In the variant of CSL used in PRISM, the probability bound  p can be replaced
by =?, which denotes that one is looking for the value of the probability rather than verifying whether it respects a certain
bound. The intervals I = [0, t] and I = [t,∞) are usually written as ≤ t and ≥ t, resp.
It is worth pointing out that the CTL formulae Aϕ (i.e. all paths fulﬁl ϕ) and E ϕ (i.e. there exists a path that fulﬁls ϕ)
coincide, under proper fairness constraints, with the degenerate CSL formulae P≥1 (ϕ) and P>0 (ϕ) [42,40]. Consequently,
PRISM can also be used to check qualitative, functional, properties of stochastic models, a feature we will use in the sequel.
The basis for the deﬁnition of CTMCs are exponential distributions of random variables. The parameter which completely
characterises an exponentially distributed randomvariable is its rate λ, which is a positive real number. A real-valued random
variable X is exponentially distributed with rate λ (written EXP(λ)) if the probability of X being at most t, i.e. Prob(X ≤ t),
is 1− e−λt if t ≥ 0 and is 0 otherwise, where t is a real number. The expected value of X is λ−1. Exponentially distributed
random variables enjoy thememory-less property, i.e. Prob(X > t + t′ | X > t) = Prob(X > t′), for t, t′ ≥ 0.
CTMCs have been extensively studied in the literature (a comprehensive treatment can be found in [36], while we suggest
[43] for a gentle introduction). For the purposes of this article, it sufﬁces to recall that a CTMCM is a pair (S ,R), where S is
a ﬁnite set of states and R : S × S → IR≥0 is the rate matrix. The rate matrix characterises the transitions between the states
of M. The probability that a transition will be taken from state s within time t is 1 − e−
∑
s′∈S R(s,s′)·t , while the probability
that such a transition leads to state s′′ is R(s, s′′)/
∑
s′∈S R(s, s′). We would like to point out that the traditional deﬁnition of
CTMCs does not include self-loops, i.e. transitions from a state to itself. On the other hand, the presence of such self-loops
does not alter the standard analysis techniques (e.g. transient and steady-state analyses) and self-loops moreover turn out
to be useful when model checking CTMCs [44]. We thus allow them in this article.
In PEPA, systems can be described as interactions of components that may engage in activities in much the same way as in
other process algebras. Components reﬂect the behaviour of relevant parts of the system, while activities capture the actions
that the components perform. A component may itself be composed of components. The speciﬁcation of a PEPA activity
consists of a pair (action type, rate) in which action type symbolically denotes the type of the action, while rate characterises
the exponential distribution of the activity duration. The PEPA expressions used in this article have the following syntax:
P ::= (α, r).P | P + P | P L P | X
The basicmechanism to construct behavioural expressions is through preﬁxing. Component (α, r)·P carries out activity (α, r),
with action type α and duration  t determined by rate r. The average duration is given by 1/r since, by deﬁnition,  t
is an exponentially distributed random variable, with rate r. After performing the activity, the component behaves as P.
Component P + Q models a system that may behave either as P or as Q , representing a race condition between components.
The co-operation operator P L Q deﬁnes the set of action types L on which components P and Q must synchronise (or co-
operate); both components proceed independently with any activity not occurring in L. The notation || is often used instead
of ∅. The expected duration of a co-operation of activities α ∈ L is a function of the expected durations of the corresponding
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Fig. 5. The ‘lost update’ phenomenon.
activities in the components. Roughly speaking, it corresponds to the longest one (the actual deﬁnition can be found in [37],
where the interested reader can ﬁnd all formal details of PEPA). A special case is the situation in which one component is
passive (i.e. has the special rate -) w.r.t. the other component. In this case the total rate is determined by that of the active
component only. The behaviour of process variable X is that of P, provided that a deﬁnition X = P is available for X .
4. An event notiﬁcation service for thinkteam
The addition of a pub/sub event notiﬁcation service to thinkteamwas originally proposed in order to solve a problem that
commonly arises in connection with the usage of composite documents, and which is a variant of the classic ‘lost update’
phenomenon. This phenomenon, sketched in Fig. 5, may come into play when a client performs a checkOut/modify/checkIn
cycle on a document that may be used as reference copy by other clients.
Note that, in order to maximise concurrency, a checkOut in thinkteam creates an exclusive lock for write access but not
for read access. It is thus possible for clients to gain read access to documents that are checked out by others. An automatic
solution of this conﬂict is not easy, as it is critically related to the type, nature and scope of the changes thatwill be performed
on the document. Moreover, standard but harsh solutions—like maintaining a dependency relation between documents and
use it to simply lock all documents that depend on the one being checked out—are out of the question for think3, as theywould
cause these documents to be unavailable for too long periods of time. For thinkteam, the preferred solution is thus to leave
the resolution of such conﬂicts to the users. In order to assist the users solving this problem, a pub/sub event notiﬁcation
service has been proposed which would provide the means to supply the clients with adequate information, viz.
• inform a client issuing a checkOut of any outstanding reference copies, and
• notify the copy holders of every checkOut/checkIn of the original document.
The service which think3 proposed to add actually is more reﬁned than the one described above. All users subscribed to a
document are notiﬁed whenever a user extracts this document from the Vault for editing purposes. Moreover, as soon as the
user ﬁnishes editing and publishes the document in the Vault again, this causes an update on this document to all users that
are subscribed to it. Hence not only those holding a read-only copy of the document receive up-to-date information on its
status, but all users that are registered for the speciﬁc document. The material in this section is partly based on our earlier
work on the analysis of a pub/sub extension to thinkteam presented in [45,18,19].
4.1. The thinkteam protocol
Thinkteam’s functioning is deﬁned by its underlying multi-user communication schema, which we will refer to as the
thinkteamprotocol.Wedeﬁne amodel of thinkteam’s groupwareprotocolwhich covers faithfully all aspectswhich are relevant
for our analysis and we extend it with the pub/sub event notiﬁcation service. In particular, we focus on the communication
schema and, as a result, we abstract completely from the RDBMS and the details of all its related operations. The resulting
model of the extended thinkteam protocol that we use is depicted in Fig. 6. The model has been validated both with thor-
ough discussion with—and revision by—think3 experts, supported also by Spin simulations, and by positive model-checking
outcomes.
The general model is composed of three components, viz. the Vault, the Concurrency Controller process (CC) and the
User. In the actual veriﬁcation sessions we report about in this paper we conﬁgured the model with 3, and sometimes 4,
instances of the User. While the User is assumed located on the client side, the Vault and the CC are assumed located on the
server side. The messages that can be sent from one component to another are those described in Section 2.1, completed
with the messages register, unRegister, notify, update, got, checkedOut and notAvailable, whose functioning we explain next.
The ﬁrst four messages concern the added pub/sub event notiﬁcation service. Users can explicitly subscribe (unsubscribe)
themselves to a ﬁle by sending a register (unRegister) to the CC. Furthermore, the get operation is altered such that a user
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Fig. 6. The augmented thinkteam protocol.
issuing it is implicitly registered for the relevant ﬁle. If users are subscribed to a certain ﬁle, then they are sent a notify by the
CCwhenever another user either extracts this ﬁle from the Vault via a checkOut or keeps a ﬁle checked out via a checkInOut, in
which case this notify is preceded by an update. Similarly, they receive an update from the CCwhenever another user inserts
(publishes) a ﬁle in the Vault. Finally, to make the ‘direction’ of a message clear from the name of that message, a user that
requests a read-only copy of a ﬁle through a get receives the copy by a got, while a user requesting editing rights for a ﬁle
through a checkOut either receives the ﬁle by a checkedOut or receives a notAvailable, depending on the ﬁle’s availability.
Some typical series of actions that can take place in this augmented thinkteam protocol are the following. A User can
indicate that she wants to extract a ﬁle from the Vault by sending a checkOut to CC. Upon receiving this action, CC checks
whether this ﬁle is available or whether it is locked as the result of an extraction by another user. If the ﬁle is not locked,
then CC sends it to the User that requested it via a checkedOut and it moreover sends a notify to all other users registered for
that ﬁle, while otherwise (i.e. if the ﬁle is locked) the User receives a notAvailable. Recall that at any moment in time, a User
can explicitly subscribe (unsubscribe) to a ﬁle by sending a register (unRegister) to CC. Rather than extracting a ﬁle, a User
can always request a read-only copy of a ﬁle by sending a get to CC, upon which CC sends her the ﬁle via a got and moreover
implicitly registers this User for the ﬁle. The User that has extracted a ﬁle has three options, viz.
• modify the ﬁle and then put it back into the Vault by sending it via a checkIn to CC,
• refrain from modifying the ﬁle and simply return the ﬁle as it was by sending an unCheckOut to CC, or
• insert a modiﬁed version of the ﬁle into the Vault—while keeping the ﬁle in her possession for further editing—by
sending it to CC via a checkInOut (in which case the ﬁle remains locked for other users, who can however always obtain
a read-only version of the ﬁle by means of a get operation).
In either of these cases, the CC sends an update to all other users that are registered for this extracted ﬁle, whereas only in the
latter case CCmoreover sends a notify to all those other users—indicating that the ﬁle remains locked—and it does so after it
has sent the update. Finally, a User can always decide to insert a new ﬁle into the Vault by sending it to CC via an import.
4.2. Model checking the thinkteam protocol
In this section we present the Promela speciﬁcation and some of the results of the veriﬁcation of concurrency control
properties andproperties that are related touser awareness. Inparticular,we showthatbyaddingapub/subeventnotiﬁcation
service to thinkteam, the users’ awareness of the status of the development of the engineering product and the activities of the
design team increases, which helps users to avoid the lost-update problems. In fact the pub/sub mechanism automatically
informs subscribed users about changes to relevant ﬁles.
4.2.1. The Promela speciﬁcation
The full and commented Promela speciﬁcation of the augmented thinkteam protocol is given in Appendix A.2 Here we
list the assumptions on which it is based and provide a justiﬁcation where necessary.
Besides the modelling decisions described in Section 4.1, we made several assumptions in our speciﬁcation in order to
reduce the size of both the state space and the state vector (used by Spin to uniquely identify a system state). The most
important assumptions, and their impact on the Promela speciﬁcation, are:
1. At any moment, there is only one ﬁle (called ﬁle 0) in the Vault, hence the import of a ﬁle by a user currently is not
modelled. Thismay seema strong limitationof themodel, but theproperties of interest focus onmutual exclusivewrite
access of users interested in modifying the same ﬁle and related notiﬁcation actions. This justiﬁes this abstraction.
2. The administrative user actions notify and update are always enabled. To achieve this, process User has an associated
UserAdmin process, which does nothing else than receiving the notify and updatemessages.
2 This is a slightly improved version of the speciﬁcation in [45].
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3. After a User has sent a get to the CC it ‘actively waits’ for an answer, i.e. the user activity is suspended, whereas users
can be involved in further interactionswhilewaiting for the CC to respond to their checkOut. This ismodelled bymeans
of a speciﬁc Promela input command. This assumption has been made to considerably reduce the size of the state
space, without interfering with relevant correctness properties.
4. No message is ever lost. Message loss is dealt with by lower-level communication protocols.
5. The transmission timeofmessages betweenuser and server is considerably smaller than the inter-arrival timebetween
requests fromdifferent users. This results in a very lowprobability of competing requests. Thereforewe chose tomainly
use handshake channels for communication, which reduces considerably the memory requirements for veriﬁcation.
Further veriﬁcations with Spin indeed showed that replacing these handshake channels by channels with a small
buffer, in order to model a more asynchronous communication, still leads to feasible memory requirements while
preserving the correctness of the veriﬁed properties [45]. This justiﬁes this abstraction.
Under the above assumptions we obtained a Promelamodel onwhich the exhaustive veriﬁcation of a number of correctness
properties of the thinkteam protocol with Spin has been possible. All reported veriﬁcations were performed by running
Spin v4.1.3 on a SUN® workstation with 1000 Mb of available physical memory. The details of most of the veriﬁcations that
we performed can be found in [45,18]. Here we summarise their outcome.
4.2.2. Deadlock detection
We performed a so-called full state-space search for invalid endstates, which is Spin’s formalisation of deadlock states, in
case of 2–4 users. The results are summarised in Table 3.
In case of 4 Users, the available physical memory proved to be insufﬁcient. However, after disabling the explicit register
(but still allowing implicit registration by means of a get) and enabling Spin’sminimised automaton procedurewith 28 as the
maximal depth of the graph that is constructed for theminimised automaton representation (cf. [17] for details) no deadlocks
were found—while a full state-space search was accomplished.
The reported results give a good impression of the fast-growing state-space size in applications of this kind and, conse-
quently, of the difﬁculties in obtaining exhaustive veriﬁcations of relevant properties. This is one of the major reasons for
some of the unsuccessful applications of model checking to groupware systems in the past [8] and the main motivation for
the assumptions introduced in the previous section.
4.2.3. Veriﬁed properties
Further properties relevant to the correctness of the thinkteam protocol with a pub/sub event notiﬁcation service can be
divided into three classes: classic concurrency control properties, potential denial of service (starvation) and awareness-
related properties. The veriﬁcation of most of these properties has been described in detail in our earlier work [45,18]. Here
we summarise the results and illustrate the formalisation of some of the less common awareness properties. Four basic
concurrency control properties have been veriﬁed:
CC-1 Every lock request must eventually be responded to
CC-2 At any moment in time and for every ﬁle, only one user may possess a lock
on that ﬁle
CC-3 Every lock on a ﬁle must eventually be released
CC-4 A lock on a ﬁle is not released as the result of a checkInOut
The awareness properties focus on verifying whether the protocol deals properly with the notiﬁcations to the users so that
they are in the position to properly keep track of the developments of the manufact design that is directly relevant to them:
AW-1a A user does not receive a notify if she is not registered for the ﬁle the notify
refers to
AW-1b A user does not receive an update if she is not registered for the ﬁle the update
refers to
AW-2a Every checkOut must eventually lead to a notify to all users registered for the
ﬁle that the checkOut refers to
AW-2b Every checkInOut must eventually lead to a notify to all users registered for
the ﬁle that the checkInOut refers to
AW-3 Every unCheckOut, checkIn and checkInOut must eventually lead to an update
to all users registered for the ﬁle the messages refer to
Finally, we veriﬁed one denial of service property:
DoS No user can be denied a service forever
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Table 3
Results of full state-space searches for deadlocks.
Users State vector Depth reached Deadlock Memory used Flags
2 84 byte 4423 No 37.574 Mbytes
3 108 byte 483303 No 129.529 Mbytes
4 132 byte 10484899 No 916.095 Mbytes -DMA=28
Obviously some of these properties, like those regarding the locking-based concurrency control mechanism, should also be
satisﬁed by the basic, not yet extended thinkteam protocol. The awareness criteria, however, are speciﬁcally related to the
pub/sub event notiﬁcation service.
4.2.4. Awareness
Belowwe illustrate the formalisation and veriﬁcation of some of the aforementioned awareness properties. Though never
mentioned speciﬁcally, for all formulae in the sequel that contain a logical implication we have veriﬁed that the left-hand
side can indeed become true in at least one system run. Moreover, in the sequel we will not spell out the exact points in the
Promela speciﬁcation where speciﬁc labels identifying relevant points of process executions have been added, but we will
simply list them and assume their positions to be clear from the description. Otherwise, cf. the full Promela speciﬁcation
given in Appendix A.
No illegal notify (update). Criterion AW-1a(b) states that users do not receive a notify (update) if they are not registered
for the ﬁle thesemessages refer to, i.e. the user does not receive any ‘illegal’ notify (update).We thus need to verify that a notify
(update) is preceded by either a get or a register; moreover, we have to verify that this is the case whenever an unRegister
takes place. Notice that both the above requirements must be fulﬁlled; in fact, a run in which a get or register is followed
by an unRegister, which in turn is followed by notify, and such that there is no get or register between such a unRegister and
the notify would satisfy the ﬁrst but not the second requirement. On the other hand, a run where no unRegister at all takes
place would trivially satisfy the second requirement. Identical considerations apply w.r.t. update. The ﬁrst requirement is an
instance of the typical precedence pattern: the requirement that a precedes b is expressed by¬(¬a U b), i.e. it is never the case
that b can occur without a having taken place; if we furthermore want the precedence to be satisﬁed whenever c happens,
thenwe have to use the additional invariant(c−> ¬(¬a U b)), which gives the pattern for the second requirement. In order
to instantiate a, b, and c properly, we added several labels to the speciﬁcation of the User process, viz. doneGet, doneRegister
and doneUnRegister—right after the Userhas sent a get (register, unRegister, resp.) to the CC.We furthermore added two labels
to the speciﬁcation of the UserAdmin process, viz. doneNotify and doneUpdate—right after it has received a notify (update)
from CC. The formula that expresses Criterion AW-1a with reference to the ﬁrst user is then:
¬(¬GetOrRegister U Notify)
∧
(UnRegister −> ¬(¬GetOrRegister UNotify))
where GetOrRegister stands for User@doneGet ∨ User@doneRegister, Notify stands for UserAdmin@doneNotify, and UnRegister
stands for atomic proposition User@doneUnRegister. A similar formula can be veriﬁed for Criterion AW-1b, using label
doneUpdate instead of label doneNotify. Spin takes about 20min to verify that the formula is satisﬁed.We veriﬁed analogous
versions of these LTL formulae for the other users.
Notify if registered. Criterion AW-2a states that every checkOut must eventually result in a notify to all users registered
for the ﬁle these messages refer to. Let us consider a generic state of a run; this would be a bad state w.r.t. the criterion if
in this state a user, say User0, has registered itself and a checkOut is then performed by one of the other two users, User1
or User2, which is not followed by a notiﬁcation to User0 despite this user had not unregistered (after its registration and)
before the checkOut has taken place. In order to capture such a bad behaviour we added some user-speciﬁc labels to the
speciﬁcation of the CC process, viz. doneGet0, doneRegister0 and doneUnRegister0—where CC receives a get, a register and an
unRegister from User0—doneCheckedOut1, doneCheckedOut2—where CC responds to User1 and User2 respectively by sending
them a checkedOut—and doneNotify0—by which the CC sends a notify to User0. The above bad behaviour is captured by the
following formula:
Registered0 ∧ (¬UnRegistered0 U (checkOut1or2 ∧ NoNotiﬁed0))
where Registered0 stands for proposition CC@doneGet0 ∨ CC@doneRegister0, UnRegistered0 stands for CC@doneUnRegister0,
checkOut1or2 stands for the proposition CC@doneCheckedOut1 ∨ CC@doneCheckedOut2, and NoNotiﬁed0 stands for
¬CC@doneNotify0. Let AW2aBadFor0 stand for the above LTL formula. Then Criterion AW-2a w.r.t. User0 corresponds to
the LTL formula ¬AW2aBadFor0.
The formulae forCriterionAW-2aw.r.t. User1 andUser2 are similar to the aboveoneandmakeuseof further corresponding
labels. We veriﬁed the above and analogous versions of this LTL formula in which the users change roles. Spin veriﬁes each
formula in approximately 40min. All the formulae are satisﬁed. In a pretty similar waywe veriﬁed that also Criterion AW-2b
holds.
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Table 4
Results of the veriﬁcations discussed in Section 4.
Property State vector Depth reached Errors Memory used
CC-1 Respond to lock 112 byte 3147677 0 473.209 Mbytes
CC-2 Unique lock/ﬁle 108 byte 434033 0 114.783 Mbytes
CC-3 Release ﬁle+lock 116 byte 7348 1 193.862 Mbytes
CC-4 Keep ﬁle locked 108 byte 434033 0 114.783 Mbytes
AW-1a No illegal notify 112 byte 3071518 0 539.769 Mbytes
AW-1b No illegal update 112 byte 3057025 0 558.508 Mbytes
AW-2a Notify if registered 112 byte 3338868 0 967.955 Mbytes
AW-2b Notify if registered 112 byte 3945506 0 894.278 Mbytes
AW-3 Update if registered 112 byte 4038761 0 745.900 Mbytes
DoS Denial of Service 116 byte 1801 1 193.759 Mbytes
Update if registered. Criterion AW-3 states that every unCheckOut, checkIn and checkInOut must eventually result in an
update to all users that are registered for the ﬁle these messages refer to. The schema for the formalisation of this criterion
is the same as for Criterion AW-2a, namely, w.r.t User0, ¬AW3BadFor0, where formula AW3BadFor0 is the expected one:
Registered0 ∧ (¬UnRegistered0 U (OR ∧ NoUpdate0))
where NoUpdate0 stands for ¬(CC@doneUpdate0 ∨ CC@doneIOUpdate0), OR stands for the following proposition:
CC@doneUnCheckOut1 ∨ CC@doneUnCheckOut2 ∨ CC@doneCheckedIn1 ∨
CC@doneCheckedIn2 ∨ CC@doneCheckedInOut1 ∨ CC@doneCheckedInOut2
and proper labels are inserted in the relevant points of process CC. As before, similar formulae are deﬁned w.r.t. User1 and
User2. Veriﬁcation shows that also these formulae are satisﬁed.
4.3. Summary
All criteria listed in Section 4.2.3 were veriﬁed in either [45,18] or Section 4.2.4. Table 4 gives an overview of all the
veriﬁcation results.
The veriﬁcations show that the concurrency control and awareness aspects of the extended thinkteam protocol are—largely—
well designed. However, the following two criteria turned out not to be satisﬁed.
Release ﬁle + lock. The thinkteam protocol does not oblige a user to ever return a ﬁle to the Vault that she has previously
checked out. Therefore, a user that holds the lock on ﬁle 0 can endlessly perform checkInOut actions and never release this
lock. This is inherent to the thinkteamprotocol. In practice this undesirable situation is avoided by the intervention of a system
administrator that a user can contact with the request to ‘convince’ another user towards releasing the ﬁle she currently has
checked out.
Denial of Service. The CC can endlessly be kept busy by one of the users so that other users never get their turn. Also
this is an integral part of the thinkteam protocol. This is due to the fact that in thinkteam access to documents is based on
the ‘retrial’ principle. In Section 5.4 we analyse the option of adding a queue for handling pending requests and compare an
access policy based on retrial with one based on a waiting list.
5. A waiting-list access policy for thinkteam
As we have seen in Section 4.3, the problem with the denial of service property is that it may be the case that one of the
users might never get its turn to, e.g., perform a checkOut, simply because the system is continuously kept busy by the other
users, while this user did express a desire to perform a checkOut. As said before, such behaviour forms an integral part of the
thinkteam protocol. This is because access to documents is based on the ‘retrial’ principle: thinkteam currently has no queue
or reservation system handling concurrent requests for a document. Before simply extending thinkteam with a reservation
system, a complementary quantitative analysis could provide further insight in the following usability issues:
• how often, on average, do users have to express their requests before they are satisﬁed, and
• under which system conditions (number of users, ﬁle processing time, etc.) would such a reservation system really
improve usability.
Below we will address these issues.
5.1. Stochastic model of thinkteam—the retry-based access policy
In this section,we describe a stochasticmodel of thinkteam for its current retry-based access policy,whichwe later analyse
using stochastic model-checking techniques. We consider the case that there is only one ﬁle, the (exclusive) access to which
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Fig. 7. From left to right: automata of the User and the CheckOut components.
Fig. 8. PEPA model for the User component.
is handled by a CheckOut component. Basically, we abstract from the ﬁle identity andwemodel only the fact thatwhen a user
attempts to perform a checkOut, this may either complete successfully or fail due to the fact that the requested ﬁle is already
checked out. We are not interested, in this model, in describing the parallel access to different ﬁles and we furthermore
assume that a user takes at most one ﬁle at a time in checkOut for modiﬁcation.
We use the stochastic process algebra PEPA to specify the model. In Fig. 7, the models of the User and the CheckOut
components are shown graphically as stochastic automata for the mere purpose of presentation.
The corresponding formal PEPAmodel is presented in Appendix B. The PEPAmodel corresponding to the User component
is reported also in Fig. 8. The correspondence is straightforward and based on the state-oriented style of process speciﬁcation:
There is a distinct process deﬁning equation for each state, and the body of such deﬁnitions are the expected ones.
As usual, a user, after performing activitieswhich do not require access to the relevant ﬁle can express interest in checking
out the ﬁle by performing a checkOut. This is modelled by state User, the initial state of the User component. The checkOut
operation can either result in the user being granted access to the ﬁle or in the user being denied access because the ﬁle is
currently already checked out by another user. In Fig. 7, the successful execution of a checkOut is modelled by activity (cOs, λ),
leading to state User1, while a failed checkOut ismodelled by (cOf , λ), leading to state User2. If the user does not obtain the ﬁle,
then she may retry to obtain it, modelled by activity (cOs, θ) in case of a successful retry and by (cOf , θ) in case the checkOut
failed. The checkIn operation, ﬁnally, is modelled by activity (cI,μ). In the sequel, we will often call λ (θ , μ, resp.) the request
(retry, edit, resp.) rate. The CheckOut component takes care that only one user at a time can have the ﬁle in her possession.
To this aim, it simply keeps track of whether the ﬁle is checked out (state CheckOut1) or not (state CheckOut, the initial state
of the component).
The system with three users is modelled by the following PEPA term:
(User||User||User) {cOs ,cOf ,cI}CheckOut
The PEPA speciﬁcations are accepted as input by PRISM and then translated into the PRISM language. The resulting
speciﬁcation is given in Appendix C. From such a speciﬁcation, PRISM automatically generates a CTMC with 19 states and
54 transitions that can be found in [46].
We use CSL to formalise and analyse in the above model various usability issues concerning the retry-based access
policy used in thinkteam. In this context, it is important to ﬁx the time units one considers. We choose hours as our time
unit. For instance, if μ = 5 this means that a typical user keeps the ﬁle in its possession for 60/5 = 12 min on average. In
the next sections we show the analyses we performed. All experiments have been performed by running PRISM v2.0 on
an ordinary PC, taking only a few seconds of CPU time each. The iterative numerical method used for the computation of
probabilities was Gauss-Seidel and the accuracy 10−6. For details concerning these options, we refer the reader to [35] and
to http://www.prismmodelchecker.org.
5.2. Analyses of performance properties
We ﬁrst analyse the probability that a user that has requested the ﬁle and is now in ‘retry mode’ (state User2 of the User
component) obtains the requested ﬁle within the next ﬁve hours. This property can be formalised in CSL as
P=? ([ TRUE U≤5 User1 {User2 } ]), (P0)
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where atomic proposition User1 (User2, resp.) holds whenever component User is in state User1 (User2, resp.).3
Formula P0 must thus be read as follows: “what is the probability that path formula TRUE U≤5 User1 is satisﬁed for state
User2?”.
The results for Formula P0 are presented in Fig. 9a for request rate λ = 1 (i.e. on average a user requests the ﬁle 1 h after
its last successful access), retry rate θ taking values 1, 5 and 10 (i.e. in 1 h a user on average retries one, ﬁve or 10 times), edit
rate μ = 1 (i.e. a user, on average, keeps the ﬁle checked out for 1 h) and for different numbers of users ranging from 1 to 10.
The edit rate in this model is close to the mean value obtained from the log-ﬁle analysis in Section 2.4. The retry rate is a
best guess, whereas the number of users considered is in line with what has been found in the log-ﬁle analysis.
Clearly, with an increasing number of users the probability that users get their ﬁle within the time interval is decreasing.
On the other hand, with an increasing retry rate and a ﬁxed edit rate the probability for a user to obtain the requested ﬁle
within the time interval is increasing. Further results could easily be obtained bymodel checking for different rate parameters
thatmay characterise different proﬁles of use of the same system. In particular, thismeasure could be used to evaluate under
which circumstances (e.g. when it is known that only a few users will compete for the same ﬁle) the retry-based access
policy would give satisfactory results from a usability point of view.
A bit more complicated measure can be obtained with some additional calculations involving steady-state analysis (by
means of model checking). Fig. 9c shows the average number of retrials per ﬁle request for request rate λ = 1, retry rate θ
taking values 5 and 10, edit rate μ ranging from 1 to 10 and for 10 users. The measure has been computed as the average
number of retries that take place over a certain system observation period of time T , after equilibrium has been reached,
divided by the average number of requests during T . We computed the average number of retries (requests) as follows. First,
we computed the steady-state probability p (q) of the user being in ‘retry mode’ (‘request mode’, resp.), i.e. p
def= S=? (User2)
(p
def= S=? (User), resp.). The fraction of time the user is in ‘retry mode’ (‘request mode’) is then given by T × p (T × q). The
average number of retries (requests) is then θ × T × p (λ × T × q). Hence the measure of interest is (θ × p)/(λ × q).
It is easy to observe in Fig. 9c that the number of retrials decreases considerably when the edit rate is increased (i.e. when
the users, on average, keep the exclusive access to a ﬁle for a shorter period of time). We also note that a relatively high edit
rate is needed to obtain an acceptably low number of retries in the case of 10 users that regularly compete for the same ﬁle.
The effect on the average number of retries is even better illustrated in Fig. 9b, where with a similar approach as outlined
above the average number of retries per ﬁle request is presented for request rate λ = 1, retry rate θ taking values 5 and 10,
ﬁxed edit rate μ = 5 and various numbers of users. Clearly, the average number of retries per ﬁle request increases sharply
when the number of users increases.
5.3. An abstract version of the retry-based model
For comparing the retry-basedmodel with the waiting-list one whichwewill describe later, in Section 5.4, we aremainly
interested in the number of users which are retrying when the relevant ﬁle is assigned to another user; more speciﬁcally, we
are interested in the number of User components which are in the ‘retry’ state User2, and in the current status of the ﬁle, i.e.
if it is checked out (state CheckOut1 of component CheckOut) or not (state CheckOut of the component). In order to describe
the kind of abstraction we are interested in, we ﬁrst give an intuitive description of the information which is attached to the
states of the PRISM CTMC associated to a PEPAmodel.4 Strictly speaking, we are dealing with state-labelled CTMCs [40]—as is
standard practice for stochastic model checking. A state-labelled CTMC is a triple (S ,R, L), where L is a function associating
each state s ∈ S to a label in some label set. Intuitively, each state s of the CTMC resulting from a PEPA model, being a global
system state, corresponds to an element of the Cartesian product of the sets of states of the components of the model. This
correspondence can be encoded in the label of s. For instance, the initial state of the PEPAmodel of the retry-based policy can
be thoughtof as labelledby 〈User, User, User, CheckOut〉; similarly, the state reachedafter anunsuccessful checkOut performed
by, say, the third user while the second user is working on the relevant ﬁle and the ﬁrst user is performing activities which do
not require access to the ﬁle, is labelled by 〈User, User1, User2, CheckOut1〉. In the followingwebrieﬂy describe the abstraction
we need; more details can be found in [46]. The abstraction of interest can be performed in two steps. We ﬁrst translate the
CTMCM = (S ,R, L) of the PEPAmodel into a CTMCM′ = (S ′,R′, L′)where each state label is replaced by one containing only
the relevant information. Then, as a second step, we minimiseM′ w.r.t. strong Markovian bisimulation equivalence [37], in
order to get a smaller model to analyse.5 M′ is easily deﬁned by letting S ′ def= S and R′ def= R and, for each s ∈ S ′, L′(s) = 〈x, y〉
where x is 0 if CheckOut is an element of L(s), i.e. the ﬁle is not checked out, and is 1 if CheckOut1 is an element of L(s), i.e. the
ﬁle is checked out, while y is the number of elements of L(s) equal to User2, i.e. the number of users which are in the retry
state. Formally, L′(s) is deﬁned as L′(s) def= 〈is(CheckOut1, c),Nretry(u1,u2,u3, c)〉 where tuple 〈u1,u2,u3, c〉 is the original label
of s, i.e. 〈u1,u2,u3, c〉 def= L(s) and functions Nretry and is are deﬁned in the expected way:
3 The actual formula accepted by PRISM is given in Appendix C. It refers to the model representation in the PRISMmodelling language, where different
states of component P are represented by different values of variable P_STATE.
4 As we already mentioned before, the actual information in PRISM CTMCs refers to the PRISM input language rather than to the PEPA one; here we refer
directly to PEPA for the sake of readability, although at the cost of some technical imprecision.
5 We recall here that steady-state properties are preserved by strong Markovian bisimulation equivalence [47].
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Fig. 9. (a)–(d) Results of the analyses performed in this section. All rates are per hour.
Nretry(v1, v2, v3, v4)
def= is(User2, v1) + is(User2, v2) + is(User2, v3)
is(w1,w2)
def=
{
1 if w1 = w2
0 if w1 = w2
Given the relatively small size of the model we performed the transformation by hand. The resulting, reduced, CTMC is
given in Fig. 10.6
Note that when a User inserts the ﬁle taken in checkOut back into the Vault via a checkIn activity, the CheckOut component
does allow another user to checkOut the ﬁle but this need not be a user that has tried before to obtain the ﬁle. In fact, a
race condition occurs between the request and retry rates associated to the checkOut activity (cf. states labelled by 〈0, 1〉 and
〈0, 2〉). Note also that once the ﬁle is checked in, it is not immediately granted to another user, even if there are users that
have expressed their interest in obtaining the ﬁle. In such a situation, the ﬁle will remain unused for a period of time which
is exponentially distributed with rate 2θ + λ in the case that two users are retrying to get the ﬁle and 2λ + θ if their is only
one user retrying.
6 Notice that the CTMC obtained by removing the self-loops from that of Fig. 10 is frequently used in the theory of retrial queues [48,49,36].
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Fig. 10. CTMC for the retry-based access policy.
Fig. 11. CTMC for the waiting-list access policy.
5.4. Stochastic model of thinkteam—the waiting-list access policy
In contrast with our model for thinkteam’s current retry-based access policy of Section 5.2, we now assume that a user’s
ﬁle request is put into a FIFO queue when the ﬁle is already in use by another user. The moment in which the ﬁle becomes
available, the ﬁrst user in this FIFO queue obtains the ﬁle. This implies the following changes w.r.t. the model of Section 5.2.
Since a user no longer retries to obtain the ﬁle after an initial unsuccessful attempt to checkOut the ﬁle, the new User
component has two states only, viz. state User2 is removed from the User component as given in Fig. 7. Moreover, since the
CheckOut component now implements a FIFO policy, the new corresponding component, i.e. component FIFO in the new
PEPA model speciﬁcation, must keep track of the number of users in the FIFO queue. The full speciﬁcations of the new User
and FIFO components are given in Appendix D and their translations into the PRISM language are given in Appendix E. From
these speciﬁcations, PRISM automatically generates a CTMC with 16 states and 30 transitions that can be found in [46].
We apply a translation also to this CTMC and minimise the result, getting the CTMC of Fig. 11. Also in this case the result
labels are pairs 〈x, y〉 where x has the same meaning as in Section 5.3 while y is the number of users in the queue. Notice
that states 〈0, 1〉 and 〈0, 2〉 no longer occur. This is due to the fact that, once the ﬁle is checked in, it is immediately granted
to another user, viz. the ﬁrst in the FIFO queue. The fact that we consider request rate λ, edit rate μ, one ﬁle and three users
means that we are dealing with a M|M|1|3 queuing system [43,36]. The CTMC of Fig. 11 is the CTMC underlying this queuing
system and this type of CTMC is also called a birth-death process [43,36].
5.5. Retry-based versus waiting-list access policy
It is interesting to compare the two models w.r.t. the probability that there are users waiting to obtain the ﬁle as a result
of a checkOut request. To obtain this measure, we compute the probabilities for at least one user not being granted the ﬁle
after asking for it, i.e. the steady-state probability p to be in a state in which at least one user has performed a checkOut but
did not obtain the ﬁle yet. In the retry-based access policy this concerns states labelled by 〈0, 1〉, 〈0, 2〉, 〈1, 1〉 and 〈1, 2〉 of the
CTMC Retrial in Fig. 10, whereas in the waiting-list access policy this concerns states 〈1, 1〉 and 〈1, 2〉 of the CTMC FIFOqueue
in Fig. 11. Hence this can be expressed as the pseudo-CSL steady-state formula7:
p
def= S=? ([ (Retrial STATE = 〈0, 1〉) ∨ (Retrial STATE = 〈0, 2〉) ∨
(Retrial STATE = 〈1, 1〉) ∨ (Retrial STATE = 〈1, 2〉) ])
for the retry-based access policy, while for the waiting-list one the formula is
p
def= S=? ([ (FIFOqueue STATE = 〈1, 1〉) ∨ (FIFOqueue STATE = 〈1, 2〉) ]).
We point out here that having used the transformed CTMC results in very simple properties which state the measures of
interest. Would we have used the original CTMCs, then we would have had to take into account all possible combinations of
one or two users being in the retry state, leading to muchmore complex CSL formulae. This would become intractable when
models with more than three users are considered.
The results of our comparison are presented in Fig. 9d for request rate λ = 1, retry rate θ (only for the retry-based access
policy of course) ranging from 1 to 10, edit rate μ taking values 5 and 10 and, as before, three users.
It is easy to see that, as expected, the waiting-list access policy outperforms the retry-based one in all the cases we
considered: The probability to be in one of the states 〈1, 1〉 or 〈1, 2〉 of the CTMC of the waiting-list access policy is always
lower than the probability of the CTMC of the retry-based access policy to be in one of the states 〈0, 1〉, 〈0, 2〉, 〈1, 1〉 or 〈1, 2〉.
7 Given the simplicity of the reduced CTMCs of Figs. 10 and 11, these formulae refer directly to their speciﬁcation in the PRISM language.
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Fig. 12. Thinkteam with replicated Vaults. Document checkIn/Out is represented by dotted arrows; metadata operations are represented by solid ones.
Note that for large θ the probability in case of the retry-based access policy is asymptotically approaching that of thewaiting-
list one, of course given the same values for λ and μ. While we did verify this for values of θ upto 109, it is of course extremely
unrealistic to assume that a user performs 109 retries per hour. We can therefore conclude that the time that a user has to
wait ‘in the long run’ for the ﬁle after it has performed a checkOut is always less when using the waiting-list access policy
than when using the retry-based access policy. Furthermore, while increasing the retry rate does bring the results for the
retry-based access policy close to those for the waiting-list one, it takes highly unrealistic retry rates to reach a difference
between the two policies that is insigniﬁcantly small.
6. Multiple replicated vaults for thinkteam
A further extension of thinkteam that think3 is considering is the addition of a service-oriented functionality, viz. that of
multiple replicated Vaults. These Vaults reside in a number of locations that are assumed to be geographically distributed
(cf. Fig. 12). thinkteam is assumed to have persistent data on the status of the replicated Vaults and on the status of all ﬁles,
i.e. whether a ﬁle is currently checked out by a designer or available for modiﬁcation.
When designers query thinkteam in this new setting, e.g. for a copy of a ﬁle, thinkteam typically responds by sending
them the address of the ‘best possible’ Vault location. Ideally, this is the designer’s preferred Vault location (e.g. with a good
connection in terms of bandwidth), while a second-best location is assigned if the preferred location is down or has a too
high workload. If, on the other hand, the most recent checkIn of the requested ﬁle was performed by the same designer, then
the local version of the ﬁle can be used, thus saving a checkOut.
Whendesigners haveobtained aVault address, theymay checkOut theﬁle, edit it and eventually checkIn theﬁle, againwith
a strong preference for their preferred Vault location. After each checkIn, the related location informs thinkteam that the ﬁle
has been uploaded. Afterwards, thinkteam updates the status of the ﬁle, i.e. removes its lock, and makes it available for other
designers requesting it. This communication also transfers the status information of the Vault locations to thinkteam. Neither
the communications between the Vault locations needed to keep them consistent nor those between the Vault locations and
thinkteam are represented in Fig. 12. In the model of the system considered in this article, we do not explicitly address the
communications between Vaults but assume that they are kept consistent using suitable algorithms. The communication
between the Vaults and thinkteam will be modelled explicitly.
6.1. Stochastic model of thinkteam
The model that we consider, and which is described in detail in Appendix F, is composed of three Vault locations
(components Va, Vb and Vc) that contain identical ﬁle repositories, three explicitly modelled Clients (components CA, CB
and CC) that compete for the same ﬁle and the thinkteam application (component TT). Each Vault location is connected to TT
and they communicate their status to TT systematically. Interesting aspects of the status of a Vault location for the purpose
of performance analysis are, e.g., its workload, availability (i.e. being up or down) and the bandwidth available to the various
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Fig. 13. Client CA.
Clients. TT keeps a record of the status of all ﬁles, i.e. whether a ﬁle is locked (because it is checked out by a Client) or available
for download and modiﬁcation.
The current model is based on the following assumptions.
1. The bandwidth between a Client and a Vault is constant and each Client prefers downloading and uploading ﬁles from
the Vault with the best connection. At times this connection may be down, however, in which case a Client will use
the next preferred Vault.
2. Each Client has a static preference list with the preferred Vault order.
3. The three explicitly modelled Clients do not inﬂuence signiﬁcantly the overall performance of the full system, which
includes many active Clients modelled only implicitly by means of the responsiveness characteristics of the various
Vaults. Our aim is to analyse a number of correctness and usability aspects of the system from these three Clients’
point of view.
4. We only consider a subset of the operations available to thinkteam Clients, viz. the most important ones: checkOut and
checkIn. This keeps the model relatively simple. Further operations can easily be added at a later stage.
5. TT is not enabled to inform a Client of the fact that the local version of the ﬁle is the most up-to-date if TT notices that
the most recent checkIn of the requested ﬁle was performed by that Client. This is future work.
6. System availability is not addressed; i.e. the possibility that all three Vaults are unavailable is not modeled. Conse-
quently a user always gets the address of a Vault from thinkteam.
Also in this case we abstract from the speciﬁc ﬁle identity and model only the fact that when a Client tries to perform a
checkOut, she may succeed or fail due to the locking status of the ﬁle under the assumption that, in general, three Clients
are interested in the same ﬁle. Instead, we focus on the interactions of different Clients with different vaults and on their
impacts on system behaviour in terms of functional and performance properties. We assume furthermore that Clients have
at most one ﬁle checked out at any time.
For a compact presentation, in the following we present the behaviour of the components graphically as abstract forms
of stochastic automata in Figs. 13 and 14, which have also been used in discussions with our colleagues from think3. The
labels of the states and transitions will play an important role in the next section, when discussing themodel’s analyses. The
transition labels are of the general form 〈from〉 〈to〉 〈action〉, in which the part 〈from〉 〈to〉 indicates the direction of the
information ﬂow between processes (e.g. CA TT denotes a communication from CA to TT) while the 〈action〉 part indicates a
speciﬁc action (e.g. cO s for successful checkOut, cO f for failed checkOut and cI for checkIn).
Client process. We describe in detail the behaviour of CA (cf. Fig. 13), that of CB and CC being similar. Initially, in state
CA, with rate λ the Client performs a request to TT to download a ﬁle for modiﬁcation. This request is successful if the ﬁle is
available (CA TT cO s, λ) and fails if the ﬁle is currently being edited by another Client (CA TT cO f, λ). In case the request
is successful, TT provides the address of the ‘best possible’ Vault location to the Client (e.g. TT CA Va means that Client CA
receives the address of Vault Va).
The policy to assign a Vault location is kept very simple in this model: Clients receive the address of their preferred Vault
location (the ﬁrst on their preference list) with highest static probability. They receive the address of different Vault locations
with lower probabilities, thus modelling the fact that the preferred Vault location is not always available, be it due to a high
workload or due to temporary unavailability. These probabilities can be tuned in order to better match the performance
characteristics of the planned system. Indications for such probabilities are obtained, e.g., from the log-ﬁle analysis of the
expected performance characteristics of the single centralised Vault currently used in thinkteam (cf. Section 2.4).
When Client CA has obtained the address of a Vault location, the Client can download (e.g. from Vault A by (Va CA,-))
the requested ﬁle, then edit the ﬁle for about 1/νA time units while in state CA 4, which is left with transition (CA CA,νA)
and, ﬁnally, upload the ﬁle to a Vault by means of a checkIn (e.g. to Vault A by (CA Va cI,-)), following a preference list as
for downloading, and return to the initial state CA. Actions with a rate that is indicated by ‘-’ are passive, i.e. the rate value
is established during synchronisation—in this case between the Client process and the Vault process, with the Vault process
determining its value.
If the Client’s request for a ﬁle fails, a series of retry actions is started (state CA 2), with rate θ , to obtain the ﬁle at a later
moment. After a number of successive failed requests, the Client eventually performs a successful request andmoves to state
CA 1 (we recall here that PRISM assumes a fair process semantics, i.e. the probability of any set of unfair runs amounts to 0).
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Fig. 14. From left to right: Vault Va and TT.
Fig. 15. Close-up of transitions from state TT 1 1 to state TT 2.
Vault process. In the following we describe component Va (cf. Fig. 14), the behaviour of Vb and Vc being very similar.
Each Vault (location) can receive download operations from a Client (for Va and client, say CB, by (Va CB,γ Ba )) with rate γ
B
a
corresponding to the average download time 1/γ Ba for that speciﬁc Client and Vault, alternated with checkIn operations
(again, in the case of CB, CB Va cI,μBa) with rate μ
B
a . After each checkIn, the Vault informs TT (by (Va TT,δ)) that the ﬁle has
been uploaded to the Vault. In this way, TT can update the status of the ﬁle, i.e. remove the lock andmake it available to other
Clients. The same communication also models the transfer of the status information of the Vaults to TT.
TT process. The behaviour of TT is modelled as follows (cf. Fig. 14). Initially, TT waits for ﬁle requests from Clients that it
may honour (e.g. from CA by action (CA TT cO s,-)). In case of such a successful ﬁle request, TT assigns a Vault to the Client,
using the assignment policy described above.
This policy can be modelled in a stochastic way by creating a race condition between the different assignments in the
following way. If one wants that Client A is assigned Vault A in approximately 50% of the cases, Vault B in approximately 33%
and Vault C in approximately 16% of the cases, one can choose suitable rates that reﬂect this. For instance, state TT 1 1 has
three outgoing transitions, labelled by (TT CA Va,300), (TT CA Vb,200) and (TT CA Vc,100), as is shown in a close-up of
that fragment of the model in Fig. 15.
The total exit rate from state TT 1 1 is thus 300 + 200+ 100 = 600, and the probability that Vault A is assigned to Client A
is then 300/600 = 0.5. These relatively high exit rates model the fact that Vault assignment is very fast as compared to the
other activities.8 Actions such as (TT CA Vb,) model assigning a Vault, locking the ﬁle and sending the address of Vault B
to Client A. Any further request for the same ﬁle is explicitly denied (e.g. to Client B by (CB TT cO f),-) until TT has received
a message from a Vault indicating that the ﬁle has been uploaded (e.g. for Vault B by (Vb TT,-)). TT is then back in its initial
state, ready to accept further requests for the ﬁle.
Full speciﬁcation. The speciﬁcation of thinkteam is completed by the parallel composition of the three Client components
(CA, CB, CC) the three Vault components (Va, Vb, Vc), and the TT component, as follows (with X=A,B,C, y=a,b,c and z=f,s):
(CA||CB||CC){CX TT cO z,TT CX Vy,CX Vy cI,Vy CX}(TT{Vy TT}(Va||Vb||Vc)).
The complete PEPA speciﬁcation and its translation into the PRISM language are given in Appendices F and G, resp. From
such a speciﬁcation, PRISM automatically generates a CTMC with 104 states and 330 transitions.
Note that we have restricted themodel to the investigation of the performance characteristics for three Clients competing
for the sameﬁleduring approximately the sameperiod.Moredetailed analyses of the log-ﬁlemightprovidemore information
on the typical andmaximal number of Clients that usually compete for the same ﬁle. Themodel can easily be extended with
a limited number of explicitly modelled Clients, along the same lines as in Section 5.
6.2. Analysis of the model of thinkteam with multiple replicated vaults
All the analyses reported in this section were performed with the stochastic model checker PRISM v3.1.1 on an ordinary
PC and, in the case of a model with three Clients, took a negligible amount of CPU time.
The rate values used for the analyses are given in Table 5 except when explicitly stated. These rates should be read
considering that the letters in the subscripts refer to the names of the Vaults while those in the superscripts indicate the
Clients. Hence μA
b
, e.g., is the upload rate between Vault B and Client A, which equals the download rate γ A
b
between Vault B
and Client A.
8 For reasons of space and readability, these details are abstracted from in Fig. 14: Only a nominal indication  of the relevant rates is given.
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Table 5
Rate values used for the functional analyses.
λ
μAa
γ Aa
μBa
γ Ba
μCa
γ Ca
μA
b
γ A
b
μB
b
γ B
b
μC
b
γ C
b
μAc
γ Ac
μBc
γ Bc
μCc
γ Cc ν
A νB νC θ δ 
2
2
3
3
0.1 60 20 40 40 60 20 20 40 60 0.3 0.3 0.3 6 100 100 200 300
Fig. 16. (a) Probability for a Client to checkIn a ﬁle within 5 h after the checkOut. (b) Percentage of time Client A spends on activities (varying ﬁle inter-access
times).
The time units in this model are hours. This means for instance that rate νA = 0.3 models that on average Client A spends
60/0.3 = 200 min editing a ﬁle, while rate θ = 6 models that on average a Client retries to checkOut a locked ﬁle every
60/6 = 10 min.
6.2.1. Analyses of functional properties
Before undertaking performance analyses of the model, it is important to gain conﬁdence in its correctness by verifying
several qualitative properties. We have veriﬁed, e.g., the absence of deadlocks, various progress properties and mutual
exclusion of the right to edit a ﬁle. Two examples of such properties are the following.
Whenever CA successfully manages to checkOut a ﬁle from Va, eventually a checkIn of that ﬁle is performed. This property
is captured by the following pseudo-CSL formula:
P≥1 ([ TRUE U CA 5 {CA 3 1 } ]), (P1)
where atomic proposition CA 5 (CA 3 1, resp.) holds whenever CA is in state CA 5 (CA 3 1, resp.). Veriﬁcation with PRISM
conﬁrmed Formula P1 to hold for the model.
The probability should be (at most) zero that two (or more) Clients will eventually obtain permission to modify the same
ﬁle at the same time. This property can be formalised in pseudo-CSL as follows:
P≤0 ([TRUE U (PermittedAB ∨ PermittedAC ∨ PermittedBC)]), (P2)
where PermittedAB stands for the proposition CA 1 ∧ CB 1 with CA 1 (CB 1, resp.) holding whenever component CA is in
state CA 1 (CB is in state CB 1, resp.). PermittedAB thus means that both CA and CB have been permitted to edit the ﬁle.
PermittedAC and PermittedBC are deﬁned similarly. Veriﬁcation with PRISM conﬁrmed that Formula P2 holds for the model.
6.2.2. Analyses of performance properties
In this section we show some performance aspects of the model, and in particular some usability aspects seen from the
perspective of the Clients.
Swiftness of returning ﬁle. Formula P1 above only shows that Clients eventually upload the ﬁle (after they downloaded
it). The following pseudo-CSL formula can be used to quantify this aspect, for client A (for clients B and C the formulae are
similar):
P=? ([ TRUE U≤5 CA 5 {CA 3 1 } ]), (P3)
i.e. what is the probability that within 5 h after successfully downloading the ﬁle (state CA 3 1), CA is in state CA 5 ready to
upload the ﬁle? The results are presented in Fig. 16a for edit rate νA varying from 0.05 to 0.5, i.e. from an average of 20 down
to 2 h of editing activity. As expected, the less time a Client spends editing, the higher the probability that the ﬁle is returned
within 5 h.
Behaviour on the long run. One of the parameters that inﬂuences the way Clients use thinkteam, and which therefore
inﬂuences the time they spend on different activities, is the average time between required accesses to the same ﬁle. The
change in average time spent on different activities by a typical Client when varying this inter-access time can be well-
observed in Fig. 16b: For each activity, the percentage of time Client A spends on that activity is shown, for various values
of λ, which has a strong impact on the request rate.
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Fig. 17. Steady-state probability for a Client to be down- or uploading ﬁles.
We see that when λ is very low, most time is spent on other activities, very little on down- and uploading and on
retrying. This pattern changes considerably as λ increases. The time spent waiting for the ﬁle (retrying) increases sharply
and, obviously, a Client spendsmuch less time on other activities. She also spendsmore time editing the ﬁle, but this increase
is not so sharp.
The family of properties analysed to obtain the results shown in Fig. 16b are simple steady-state properties of the form
S=? ([ a ]) where proposition a holds when the component of interest is in the relevant state. For instance the formula
S=? ([ CA 2 ]), (P4)
CA 2 indicates the steady-state probability of Client A retrying in order to obtain a ﬁle, given that CA 2 holds whenever CA
is in state CA 2, to indicate that Client A is retrying to obtain a ﬁle.
Time spent downloading and uploading ﬁles. The time Clients spend down- and uploading ﬁles depends largely on the
bandwidth of their connection to the Vaults, the size of the ﬁles and theworkload of the Vaults. Fig. 17 shows the effect that a
change in workload of Vaults A and B has on the percentage of time Client A spends down- and uploading ﬁles. On the x-axis
an efﬁciency factor for Vault A is shown, ranging from 10 to 100, which multiplies the download rates γ Xa , with X = A, B, C, of
Vault A for Clients A, B and C, which are initially set to 0.6, 0.2 and 0.4, resp. Likewise on the y-axis for Vault B, multiplying
the download rates of that Vault for Clients A, B and C, which are initially set to 0.4, 0.6 and 0.2, resp. All other rates are as
in Table 5. On the z-axis the steady-state probability for a Client to be down- or uploading ﬁles is shown.
Hence, the higher the efﬁciency factor, the faster the Vaults perform, and the lower the workload. Indeed, as expected,
we see that the probability that Client A spends time on down- and uploading on the long run is smallest when both Vaults
(A and B) are working optimally. We also observe that if only Vault B has a high workload (i.e. a low efﬁciency factor), and
thus performs slower, then this inﬂuences the time that Client A spends down- and uploading. This is because part of the
time Client A downloads from (and uploads to) Vault B. Note also that this percentage does not decreasemuch after a certain
performance of the Vaults has been reached: This occurs more or less at efﬁciency factor 40-50, for the parameter settings
chosen for the analysis. The results in Fig. 17 have been obtained by verifying a formula similar to Formula P4 for Client A
being in either of the states CA 3 1, CA 3 2, CA 3 3 or CA 5.
Number of retries per success. The perceived usability of thinkteam also depends on how often it happens that a Client
cannot obtain a ﬁle that she intends to modify. Failing to obtain a ﬁle means that the Client needs to spend time on either
keep trying to obtain it at a later stage or change her work-plan and search for another ﬁle. If this situation occurs frequently,
a Client might perceive this as annoying. Moreover, it may lead to the introduction of errors (the Client may forget to edit
the ﬁle later, or forget what modiﬁcations to make) or to problems in the overall workﬂow plan, and thus result in a delay in
the delivery of the ﬁnal product. It would therefore be useful to be able to quantify this problem under various conditions
and for different user proﬁles of Clients using thinkteam. For instance, the different phases of design may induce a different
use of thinkteam: Initially, Clients may take more time to modify a ﬁle because of a completely new design, but closer to the
deadline there might be a phase in which many Clients need to frequently make small modiﬁcations in order to ﬁne-tune
the various components.
Fig. 18 shows the results of one such an analysis. On the x-axis an ampliﬁcation factor for both the edit and the retry rates
is shown, ranging from 1 to 10. On the y-axis the request rate λ is shown. The z-axis shows the average number of retries that
Client A needs before obtaining the permission to modify a ﬁle changes with the simultaneous increase of the edit and retry
rates (modelling Client behaviour close to a deadline) and an increase in the frequency with which Client A needs the ﬁle
time and again. The chosen edit and retry rates are 0.025 and 0.5, resp., which have been multiplied with a factor ranging
from 1 to 10. The ﬁgure also shows how the number of retries per success changes with the request rate λ. Given that we
consider on average three users competing for a ﬁle, the total inter-access rate is 3λ. This means that the inter-access time
of ﬁles is ranging from 4 h to 1 h, modelling a usage pattern with time characteristics that is situated towards the faster end
of the spectrum shown in Section 2.4.
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Fig. 18. (a) Average number of retries Client A needs to obtain a ﬁle. (b) Average number of retries Client A needs to obtain a ﬁle if she reorganises her
work-plan.
Fig. 18a has been obtained by extending the PRISM speciﬁcation of our model with a reward structure to count the
number of successful requests and another one to count the number of retries. Reward structures deﬁned over a CTMC
deﬁne which actions need to be counted. Subsequently, the model can be analysed with respect to a number of reward-
based properties. We use the steady-state reward formula that calculates the average reward on the long run. Its syntax
is R { "label" }=? [ S ], in which "label" is a reward structure and S denotes that the steady-state reward is calculated. The
number of repeated failed requests per successful request shown in Fig. 18a is thus obtained by dividing the outcome of
this formula for label=NrFailedRequestsClientA by that for label=NrSuccessfulRequestsClientA. The deﬁnition of the reward
structures can be found in Appendix H.
Despite the fact that there are relatively few Clients needing the same ﬁle more or less in the same period, the number
of retries required to obtain the permission to edit a ﬁle is relatively high. Few Clients would be happy to have to try more
than thirty times to get access to a ﬁle. If we were to adjust our model by allowing Clients to change work-plan in case a ﬁle
is not available, i.e. let the Client choose another ﬁle for editing, then the situation would improve. Such an adjustment is
relatively simple: It sufﬁces to add one transition in CA from the retry state CA 2 to the initial state CA, and similarly in CB and
CC from CB 2 and CC 2, resp., to their initial sates. The results for the new model of the above reward-based properties are
shown in Fig. 18b. Of course this model is relatively optimistic in the sense that usually clients need to have access to a ﬁle
within a given time and cannot always deliberately decide to perform other activities ﬁrst.
Other solutions can be conceived which would still be based on variations of the retry policy like adding further retry
stateswith different rates, or even replacing the simple retry statewith an additional CTMCmodelling different sub-phases of
a retry phase based on amore sophisticated discipline. In particular, reﬁning the retry state into a new CTMC characterising a
(sequence of) Phase-Typedistribution(s) [50] could beoneway for approximating general (i.e. non-exponential) distributions
of (subsequent phases of) the retry phase.
We leave these extensions for further study and, instead, in the present paperwe showed the impact of replacing the retry
policy with a reservation policy or extending thinkteam with an event notiﬁcation service, in a simple version of thinkteam
with one single centralised Vault.
7. Lessons learned
During interactive design sessions with think3, which included both physical meetings and meetings by means of group-
ware systems like teleconferencing and electronic mail, think3 has acquired a basic knowledge of Spin and of the stochastic
model checker PRISM. In fact, we have been able to use these model checkers in various ways to present the behaviour
of our models of the groupware protocols underlying thinkteam and its proposed extensions. Examples include simulation,
message sequence charts and counterexamples. This has helped to detect a number of ambiguities and unclear aspects of
the designs that think3 had in mind regarding the proposed thinkteam extensions. Examples include the two criteria (CC-3
and DoS) that were shown to be invalid (cf. Section 4), the additional Criterion AW-2b that was formulated in the context of
our co-operation and the numerous questions that were addressed during these interactive meetings. To give an idea of the
type of questions, we list three of them, with their answers.
When exactly are which requests enabled? Our initial model of thinkteam prohibited a user to perform a get after initiating
a checkOut for the same ﬁle. However, think3 realised that it was preferred to allow a get also after a checkedOut has been
obtained. Such a get should be seen as a kind of ‘re-get’.
What are the exact semantics of requests? Our initial model of thinkteam allowed a user to (un)register for a ﬁle for which
she possessed editing rights. think3 showed us that in practice such situations are undesirable. Ourmodel does, however,
allow a user to (un)register for a ﬁle as long as she is waiting for a response to the checkOut that she sent for this ﬁle.
After all, this response may also be negative.
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How are concurrent requests handled? As mentioned before, access to ﬁles through thinkteam is currently based on the
‘retrial’ principle: There is no queue (or reservation system) handling concurrent ﬁle requests. As a result of our co-
operation, think3 is investigating whether it would be useful to equip thinkteam with a ﬁle reservation system.
Think3 furthermore has expressed the intention to use our model of thinkteam extended with a pub/sub event notiﬁcation
service as a basis for the planned implementation of this extension, which of course will provide increased conﬁdence on
the usefulness of the system design.
The results we have obtained with the model checker PRISM have been essential to obtain feedback on the performance
aspects of the problems detected by qualitative model checking. Our relatively simple models were easy to grasp, but at the
same time allowed the analysis of quite a number of different aspects, e.g. by varying the values of the model’s parameters.
In this respect, the analysis of the log-ﬁle that has been obtained from a real use of thinkteam turned out to be extremely
useful for obtaining a realistic estimate of the parameter values. On the other hand, this log-ﬁle analysis has also showed that
some data that would have been useful for a further evaluation of usability issues is not currently collected in thinkteam’s
log-ﬁles. Hence, our co-operation has also served to develop further ideas about which data to log in the future.
For think3, the experience with model checking speciﬁcations of concurrent systems before actually implementing them,
has been a true eye opener. They have recognised the inherent concurrency aspects of groupware systems like thinkteam, as
well as their intricate behaviour. The relatively simple, lightweight and abstract high-level models that we have developed
during our co-operation, furthermore have turned out to be of great help to focus on the key issues of the development
of the interface aspects of thinkteam, before turning to the more detailed design and implementation issues. In fact, think3
has expressed the intention to install Spin and PRISM in order to get more acquainted with these model checkers and—
ultimately—to acquire the skills to perform automated veriﬁcation of the (groupware) protocols underlying their software
systems themselves. This makes our co-operation an excellent example of technology transfer to industry.
8. Conclusions and future work
The research described in this article has taken place in the context of the national Italian research project tocai.it, which
aims at the application and development of knowledge-based technologies to support the aggregation of enterprises over
the Internet. think3 is one of the industrial partners in this project. Groupware products like thinkteam are in continuous
evolution. Moreover, thinkteam is used by many important manufacturing industries that nowadays have several dislocated
design departments, each of which needs reliable and efﬁcient software systems to co-operate in an efﬁcient way. Themany
inherent concurrency aspects that think3 needs to face when producing their software, and their awareness of the difﬁculties
this implies when assessing the quality of their products, made it easier to raise their interest for the use of model-checking
techniques in the early phases of software design.
In this article, we have illustrated that with relatively simple abstract models important issues concerning asynchronous
dispersed groupware systems can be addressed. Examples include awareness, concurrency control and usability-related
issues. The feature-oriented approach combinedwith amodular, prototyping-like way of generatingmodels and results, has
shown helpful also for making think3 familiar with the possibilities and limitations of current model-checking techniques.
We have also showed the importance of a combined qualitative and quantitative analyses to be able to make informed
design decisions. The development of the models in close collaboration with think3 has showed that the activity was worth-
while to obtain precise and unambiguous speciﬁcations and has helped to provide better documentation of thinkteam. On
the other hand, the models and results have beneﬁted considerably from the information that we have managed to obtain
by analysing the log-ﬁle of the actual use of thinkteam. Still further analyses of such data can be of help to obtain models that
can also be used to analyse thinkteamwhen used under different usage patterns.We believe this to be an interesting topic for
further technology study. The models and results in their turn have also generated ideas for improved logging of thinkteam’s
user activities, in order to get more insight into the usability aspects of thinkteam at work.
Finally, the expected shift from dedicated software for collaborative systems to architectures for global/mobile computing,
which will be service oriented in nature, will raise even more issues related to concurrency and performance. Issues which
have to be addressed are those of distribution awareness and mobility—intended both as mobile computing, where mobile
devices require network connections to be open and closed dynamically, and as mobile computation, where code mobility
is required—typical of global/mobile computing as well as those of workﬂow management and session/correlation handling,
typical of service-oriented computing. Several calculi and languages have been proposed in the literature which address the
abovementioned issues (e.g. KLAIM [51], COWS [52], CaSPiS [53] and many more), together with their stochastic extensions
(e.g. StoKLAIM [54,55], Stochastic COWS [56], MarCaSPiS [57]) and related logics and prototype model-checking tools (e.g.
[58,59,60]). The goal to assess the adequacy of the above languages, logics and tools for the groupware application domain,
or to properly customise them in order to integrate them in the software development processes of groupware industries,
will be one of the future challenges.
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Appendix
A. Promela and LTL Speciﬁcations of Augmented thinkteam Protocol
In this appendix the Promela Speciﬁcation of Augmented thinkteam Protocol discussed in Section 4.2.1 is given (Ap-
pendix A.1), together with the LTL formulae in the format accepted by Spin (Appendix A.2).
A.1. Promelamodel
Macros: */
#define numUsers 3 #define numFiles 1 /* several variables below should be defined per file if numFiles
> 1 */
/* Handshake and other communication channels: */
mtype =
{
get, got, checkOut, checkedOut, notAvailable, unCheckOut, /* User */
import, checkIn, checkInOut, /* publish */
register, unRegister, /* subscribe */
update, notify, /* notification */
};
/* Channels between client and server: */
chan userToCC = [0] of {mtype, byte};
chan ccToUser[numUsers] = [1]of {mtype};
chan ccToUserAdmin[numUsers] = [0] of {mtype};
/* Internal server channels: */
chan ccToVault = [0] of {mtype, byte};
chan vaultToCC = [0] of {mtype, byte};
/* Client processes: */
proctype User(byte id)
{
byte edit[numFiles], registered[numFiles]; /* User status file 0 */
bool waitingForCheckedOut = false; /* status of checkOut */
do
:: (!waitingForCheckedOut) -> /* if User didn’t try to checkout file 0, */
todoGet: skip; /* (label for verification purposes) */
userToCC!get,id; /* then it may send get to CC and */
doneGet: skip; /* (label for verification purposes) */
ccToUser[id]?got; /* as soon as it receives got from CC, */
registered[0] = true /* it is registered for file 0 */
:: (!registered[0] && !edit[0]) -> /* if User didn’t register for nor checkout file 0, */
registered[0] = true; /* then it may want to be registered for file 0 by */
userToCC!register,id; /* sending register to CC */
doneRegister: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (registered[0] && !edit[0]) -> /* if User did register for but not checkout file 0, */
registered[0] = false; /* then it may not want to be registered for file 0 by */
userToCC!unRegister,id; /* sending unregister to CC */
doneUnRegister: skip; /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (!edit[0] && !waitingForCheckedOut) -> /* if User didn’t (try to) checkout file 0, */
waitingForCheckedOut = true; /* then it may start waitingForCheckedOut by */
userToCC!checkOut,id /* sending checkOut to CC */
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:: (edit[0]) -> /* if User has checkedOut file 0, then it may */
if
:: userToCC!unCheckOut,id -> /* either send UnCheckOut to CC and */
edit[0] = false /* no longer edit file 0, */
:: userToCC!checkIn,id -> /* or send checkIn to CC and */
edit[0] = false /* no longer edit file 0, */
:: userToCC!checkInOut,id /* or send checkInOut to CC */
fi /* (and still edit file 0) */
:: ccToUser[id]?checkedOut -> /* as soon as User receives checkedOut from CC, */
d_step{edit[0] = true; /* it may edit file 0 and */
waitingForCheckedOut = false} /* thus stop waitingForCheckedOut */
:: ccToUser[id]?notAvailable -> /* as soon as User receives notAvailable from CC, */
waitingForCheckedOut = false /* then it stops waitingForCheckedOut */
od
}
proctype UserAdmin(byte id)
{
do
:: ccToUserAdmin[id]?notify; /* User receives notify from CC */
doneNotify: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: ccToUserAdmin[id]?update -> /* User receives update from CC */
doneUpdate: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
od
}
/* Server processes: */
proctype CC()
{
byte id, ID, registered[numUsers]; /* registration per User for file 0 */
bool writeLock = false; /* status lock for file 0 */
do
:: userToCC?get,id -> /* upon receiving get from User, */
if
:: (id == 0) ->
doneGet0: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (id == 1) ->
doneGet1: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (id == 2) ->
doneGet2: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
fi;
registered[id] = true; /* User is registered for file 0, */
ccToVault!get,id; /* CC sends get to Vault, and, */
vaultToCC?got,id; /* upon receiving got from Vault, */
ccToUser[id]!got /* CC sends got to User */
:: userToCC?register,id -> /* upon receiving register from User, */
if
:: (id == 0) ->
doneRegister0: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (id == 1) ->
doneRegister1: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (id == 2) ->
doneRegister2: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
fi;
registered[id] = true /* User is registered for file 0 */
:: userToCC?unRegister,id -> /* upon receiving unRegister from User, */
if
:: (id == 0) ->
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doneUnRegister0: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (id == 1) ->
doneUnRegister1: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (id == 2) ->
doneUnRegister2: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
fi;
registered[id] = false /* User is no longer registered for file 0 */
:: userToCC?checkOut,id -> /* whenever CC receives checkOut from User: */
if
:: (id == 0) ->
doneCheckOut0: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (id == 1) ->
doneCheckOut1: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (id == 2) ->
doneCheckOut2: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
fi;
if
:: !writeLock -> /* (1) if there is no writeLock on file 0, then */
assert(writeLock == false); /* (assertion for verification purposes) */
writeLock = true; /* CC sets writeLock on file 0, */
ccToVault!checkOut,id; /* sends checkOut to Vault, and, */
vaultToCC?checkedOut,id; /* upon receiving checkedOut from Vault, */
ccToUser[id]!checkedOut; /* sends checkedOut to User (id), and */
if
:: (id == 0) ->
doneCheckedOut0: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (id == 1) ->
doneCheckedOut1: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (id == 2) ->
doneCheckedOut2: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
fi;
ID = 0;
do
:: (ID < numUsers) ->
if
:: (ID != id && registered[ID]) -> /* to each registered User, not */
ccToUserAdmin[ID]!notify; /* equal to id, CC sends notify */
if
:: (ID == 0) ->
doneNotify0: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (ID == 1) ->
doneNotify1: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (ID == 2) ->
doneNotify2: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
fi
:: else -> skip
fi;
ID++
:: else -> break
od
:: else -> /* (2) if there is a writeLock on file 0, then */
ccToUser[id]!notAvailable; /* CC sends notAvailable to User */
if
:: (id == 0) ->
doneNotAvailable0: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (id == 1) ->
doneNotAvailable1: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (id == 2) ->
doneNotAvailable2: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
fi;
fi
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:: userToCC?unCheckOut,id -> /* upon receiving unCheckOut from User, */
if
:: (id == 0) ->
doneUnCheckOut0: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (id == 1) ->
doneUnCheckOut1: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (id == 2) ->
doneUnCheckOut2: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
fi;
writeLock = false; /* CC sets writeLock to false, and */
goto Update /* updates all registered users */
:: userToCC?checkIn,id -> /* upon receiving checkIn from User, */
if
:: (id == 0) ->
doneCheckIn0: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (id == 1) ->
doneCheckIn1: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (id == 2) ->
doneCheckIn2: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
fi;
ccToVault!checkIn,id; /* CC sends checkIn to Vault, */
writeLock = false; /* sets writeLock to false, and, */
vaultToCC?update,id; /* upon receiving update (by User id) from Vault, */
if
:: (id == 0) ->
doneCheckedIn0: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (id == 1) ->
doneCheckedIn1: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (id == 2) ->
doneCheckedIn2: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
fi;
Update:ID = 0; /* updates all registered users: */
do
:: (ID < numUsers) ->
if
:: (ID != id && registered[ID]) -> /* to every registered User, not */
ccToUserAdmin[ID]!update; /* equalling id, CC sends update */
if
:: (ID == 0) ->
doneUpdate0: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (ID == 1) ->
doneUpdate1: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (ID == 2) ->
doneUpdate2: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
fi
:: else -> skip
fi;
ID++
:: else -> break
od
:: userToCC?checkInOut,id -> /* upon receiving checkInOut from User, */
ccToVault!checkIn,id; /* CC sends checkIn to Vault and */
vaultToCC?update,id; /* upon receiving update (by User id) from Vault, */
if
:: (id == 0) ->
doneCheckedInOut0: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (id == 1) ->
doneCheckedInOut1: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (id == 2) ->
doneCheckedInOut2: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
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fi;
assert(writeLock == true); /* (assertion for verification purposes) */
ID = 0; /* (1) updates all registered users: */
do
:: (ID < numUsers) ->
if
:: (ID != id && registered[ID]) -> /* to every registered User, not */
ccToUserAdmin[ID]!update; /* equalling id, CC sends update */
if
:: (ID == 0) ->
doneIOUpdate0: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (ID == 1) ->
doneIOUpdate1: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (ID == 2) ->
doneIOUpdate2: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
fi
:: else -> skip
fi;
ID++
:: else -> break
od;
ID = 0; /* (2) notifies all registered users: */
do
:: (ID < numUsers) ->
if
:: (ID != id && registered[ID]) -> /* to each registered User, not */
ccToUserAdmin[ID]!notify; /* equal to id, CC sends notify */
if
:: (ID == 0) ->
doneIONotify0: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (ID == 1) ->
doneIONotify1: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
:: (ID == 2) ->
doneIONotify2: skip /* (label for verification purposes) */
fi
:: else -> skip
fi;
ID++
:: else -> break
od
od
}
proctype Vault()
{
byte id;
do
:: ccToVault?get,id -> /* upon receiving get from CC, */
vaultToCC!got,id /* Vault sends got to CC */
:: ccToVault?checkOut,id -> /* upon receiving checkOut from CC, */
vaultToCC!checkedOut,id /* Vault sends checkedOut to CC */
:: ccToVault?checkIn,id -> /* upon receiving checkIn from CC, */
vaultToCC!update,id /* Vault sends update (by User id) to CC */
od
}
/* Initialisation process: */
init {
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byte Users = 0;
atomic
{
run Vault(); /* pid = 1 */
run CC(); /* pid = 2 */
run User(Users); /* User(0) with pid = 3 */
run UserAdmin(Users); /* UserAdmin(0) with pid = 4 */
Users++;
do
:: (Users < numUsers) ->
run User(Users); /* User(1) with pid = 5, User(2) with pid = 7, etc. */
run UserAdmin(Users); /* UserAdmin(1) with pid = 6, UserAdmin(2) with pid = 8, */
Users++ /* etc. */
:: else -> break
od
}
}
A.2. Spin LTL formulae
/* LTL formula for ‘No illegal notify’ property */
! (! getOrRegister U notify) && [] ( unRegister -> ! (! getOrRegister U notify))
/* with the following macro definitions added in the model */
#define getOrRegister (User[3]@doneGet || User[3]@doneRegister)
#define notify (UserAdmin[4]@doneNotify)
#define unRegister (User[3]@doneUnRegister)
/* The formula for ‘No illegal udate’ similar and not reported here */
/* ================================== */
/* LTL formula for ‘Notify if registered*/
[]!(registered0 && ((! unRegistered0) U (checkOut1or2 && []noNotified0)))
/* with the following macro definitions added in the model */
#define registered0 (CC[2]@doneGet0 || CC[2]@doneRegister0)
#define unRegistered0 (CC[2]@doneUnRegister0)
#define checkOut1or2 (CC[2]@doneCheckedOut1 || CC[2]@doneCheckedOut2)
#define noNotified0 (! CC[2]@doneNotify0)
/* ================================== */
/* LTL formula for ‘Update if registered*/
[]!(registered0 && ((! unRegistered0) U (or && []noUpdate0)))
/* with the following macro definitions added in the model */
/* #define registered0 (CC[2]@doneGet0 || CC[2]@doneRegister0)*/
/* #define unRegistered0 (CC[2]@doneUnRegister0) */
#define or (CC[2]@doneUnCheckedOut1 || CC[2]@doneUnCheckedOut2 || \
CC[2]@doneCheckedIn1 || CC[2]@doneCheckedIn2 || \
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CC[2]@doneCheckedInOut1 || CC[2]@doneCheckedInOut2)
#define noUpdate0 (! (CC[2]@doneUpdate0 || CC[2]@doneIOUpdate0))
B. PEPA speciﬁcation of retry-based approach with three users
lambda = 1.0; % request rate (user/hour)
mu = 5.0; % edit rate (user/hour)
theta = 5.0; % retry rate (user/hour)
#User = (cO_s,lambda).User1 + (cO_f,lambda).User2; % request mode
#User1 = (cI,mu).User; % file in possession
#User2 = (r_s,theta).User1 + (r_f,theta).User2; % retry mode
#CheckOut = (cO_s,infty).CheckOut1;
#CheckOut1 = (cI,infty).CheckOut + (cO_f,infty).CheckOut1;
(User <> User <> User) <cO_s,cO_f,cI> CheckOut
C. PRISM Speciﬁcation of retry-based approach with 3 users
In this appendix thePRISM Speciﬁcationof thinkteamwith3Usersdiscussed in Section5.1 is given (AppendixC.1), together
with the CSL formulae in the format accepted by PRISM (Appendix C.2).
C.1. PRISMmodel
ctmc
const double lambda = 1.0;
const double mu = 5.0;
const double theta = 5.0;
const int User = 0;
const int User1 = 1;
const int User2 = 2;
const int CheckOut = 0;
const int CheckOut1 = 1;
module User
User_STATE : [0..2] init User;
[cO_s] (User_STATE=User) -> lambda : (User_STATE’=User1);
[cO_f] (User_STATE=User) -> lambda : (User_STATE’=User2);
[cI] (User_STATE=User1) -> mu : (User_STATE’=User);
[cO_s] (User_STATE=User2) -> theta : (User_STATE’=User1);
[cO_f] (User_STATE=User2) -> theta : (User_STATE’=User2);
endmodule
module User_2
User_2_STATE : [0..2] init User;
[cO_s] (User_2_STATE=User) -> lambda : (User_2_STATE’=User1);
[cO_f] (User_2_STATE=User) -> lambda : (User_2_STATE’=User2);
[cI] (User_2_STATE=User1) -> mu : (User_2_STATE’=User);
[cO_s] (User_2_STATE=User2) -> theta : (User_2_STATE’=User1);
[cO_f] (User_2_STATE=User2) -> theta : (User_2_STATE’=User2);
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endmodule
module User_3
User_3_STATE : [0..2] init User;
[cO_s] (User_3_STATE=User) -> lambda : (User_3_STATE’=User1);
[cO_f] (User_3_STATE=User) -> lambda : (User_3_STATE’=User2);
[cI] (User_3_STATE=User1) -> mu : (User_3_STATE’=User);
[cO_s] (User_3_STATE=User2) -> theta : (User_3_STATE’=User1);
[cO_f] (User_3_STATE=User2) -> theta : (User_3_STATE’=User2);
endmodule
module CheckOut
CheckOut_STATE : [0..1] init CheckOut;
[cO_s] (CheckOut_STATE=CheckOut) -> 1 : (CheckOut_STATE’=CheckOut1);
[cI] (CheckOut_STATE=CheckOut1) -> 1 : (CheckOut_STATE’=CheckOut);
[cO_f] (CheckOut_STATE=CheckOut1) -> 1 : (CheckOut_STATE’=CheckOut1);
endmodule
system
((User ||| (User_2 ||| User_3)) |[cO_s,cO_f,cI]| CheckOut)
endsystem
C.2. PRISM CSL formulae
%Formula P0
P=?([true U<=5 User_STATE=User1 {User_STATE =User2}])
%Formula for steady-state probability of the user being in retry mode
S=?([User_STATE=User2])
%Formula for steady-state probability of the user being in request mode
S=?([User_STATE=User])
D. PEPA speciﬁcation of waiting-list approach with three Users
lambda = 1.0; % request rate
mu = 5.0; % edit rate
#User_0 = (cO_0,lambda).User_0a;
#User_0a = (cI_0,mu).User_0;
#User_1 = (cO_1,lambda).User_1a;
#User_1a = (cI_1,mu).User_1;
#User_2 = (cO_2,lambda).User_2a;
#User_2a = (cI_2,mu).User_2;
#FIFO = (cO_0,infty).F_0 + (cO_1,infty).F_1 + (cO_2,infty).F_2;
#F_0 = (cI_0,infty).FIFO + (cO_1,infty).F_01 + (cO_2,infty).F_02;
#F_1 = (cI_1,infty).FIFO + (cO_0,infty).F_10 + (cO_2,infty).F_12;
#F_2 = (cI_2,infty).FIFO + (cO_0,infty).F_20 + (cO_1,infty).F_21;
#F_01 = (cI_0,infty).F_1 + (cO_2,infty).F_012;
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#F_02 = (cI_0,infty).F_2 + (cO_1,infty).F_021;
#F_10 = (cI_1,infty).F_0 + (cO_2,infty).F_102;
#F_12 = (cI_1,infty).F_2 + (cO_0,infty).F_120;
#F_20 = (cI_2,infty).F_0 + (cO_1,infty).F_201;
#F_21 = (cI_2,infty).F_1 + (cO_0,infty).F_210;
#F_012 = (cI_0,infty).F_12;
#F_021 = (cI_0,infty).F_21;
#F_102 = (cI_1,infty).F_02;
#F_120 = (cI_1,infty).F_20;
#F_201 = (cI_2,infty).F_01;
#F_210 = (cI_2,infty).F_10;
(User_0 <> User_1 <> User_2) <cO_0,cO_1,cO_2,cI_0,cI_1,cI_2> FIFO
E. PRISM Speciﬁcation of Waiting-list Approach with 3 Users
ctmc
const double lambda = 1.0;
const double mu = 5.0;
const int User_0 = 0;
const int User_0a = 1;
const int User_1 = 0;
const int User_1a = 1;
const int User_2 = 0;
const int User_2a = 1;
const int FIFO_empty = 0;
const int F_0 = 1;
const int F_01 = 2;
const int F_012 = 3;
const int F_02 = 4;
const int F_021 = 5;
const int F_1 = 6;
const int F_10 = 7;
const int F_102 = 8;
const int F_12 = 9;
const int F_120 = 10;
const int F_2 = 11;
const int F_20 = 12;
const int F_201 = 13;
const int F_21 = 14;
const int F_210 = 15;
module User_0
User_0_STATE : [0..1] init User_0;
[cO_0] (User_0_STATE=User_0) -> lambda : (User_0_STATE’=User_0a);
[cI_0] (User_0_STATE=User_0a) -> mu : (User_0_STATE’=User_0);
endmodule
module User_1
User_1_STATE : [0..1] init User_1;
[cO_1] (User_1_STATE=User_1) -> lambda : (User_1_STATE’=User_1a);
[cI_1] (User_1_STATE=User_1a) -> mu : (User_1_STATE’=User_1);
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endmodule
module User_2
User_2_STATE : [0..1] init User_2;
[cO_2] (User_2_STATE=User_2) -> lambda : (User_2_STATE’=User_2a);
[cI_2] (User_2_STATE=User_2a) -> mu : (User_2_STATE’=User_2);
endmodule
module FIFO_empty
FIFO_empty_STATE : [0..15] init FIFO_empty;
[cO_0] (FIFO_empty_STATE=FIFO_empty) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_0);
[cO_1] (FIFO_empty_STATE=FIFO_empty) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_1);
[cO_2] (FIFO_empty_STATE=FIFO_empty) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_2);
[cI_0] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_0) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=FIFO_empty);
[cO_1] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_0) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_01);
[cO_2] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_0) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_02);
[cI_0] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_01) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_1);
[cO_2] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_01) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_012);
[cI_0] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_012) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_12);
[cI_0] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_02) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_2);
[cO_1] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_02) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_021);
[cI_0] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_021) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_21);
[cI_1] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_1) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=FIFO_empty);
[cO_0] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_1) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_10);
[cO_2] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_1) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_12);
[cI_1] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_10) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_0);
[cO_2] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_10) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_102);
[cI_1] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_102) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_02);
[cI_1] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_12) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_2);
[cO_0] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_12) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_120);
[cI_1] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_120) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_20);
[cI_2] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_2) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=FIFO_empty);
[cO_0] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_2) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_20);
[cO_1] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_2) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_21);
[cI_2] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_20) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_0);
[cO_1] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_20) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_201);
[cI_2] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_201) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_01);
[cI_2] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_21) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_1);
[cO_0] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_21) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_210);
[cI_2] (FIFO_empty_STATE=F_210) -> 1 : (FIFO_empty_STATE’=F_10);
endmodule
system
((User_0 ||| (User_1 ||| User_2)) |[cO_0,cO_1,cO_2,cI_0,cI_1,cI_2]| FIFO_empty)
endsystem
F. PEPA speciﬁcation of thinkteam with three users and three vaults
lambda = 0.1; % request rate (client/hour)
gamma_a_A = 60.0; % download rate (file/hour) between Vault A & Client A
gamma_a_B = 20.0; % download rate (file/hour) between Vault A & Client B
gamma_a_C = 40.0; % download rate (file/hour) between Vault A & Client C
gamma_b_A = 40.0; % download rate (file/hour) between Vault B & Client A
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gamma_b_B = 60.0; % download rate (file/hour) between Vault B & Client B
gamma_b_C = 20.0; % download rate (file/hour) between Vault B & Client C
gamma_c_A = 20.0; % download rate (file/hour) between Vault C & Client A
gamma_c_B = 40.0; % download rate (file/hour) between Vault C & Client B
gamma_c_C = 60.0; % download rate (file/hour) between Vault C & Client C
mu_a_A = 60.0; % upload rate (file/hour) between Vault A & Client A
mu_a_B = 20.0; % upload rate (file/hour) between Vault A & Client B
mu_a_C = 40.0; % upload rate (file/hour) between Vault A & Client C
mu_b_A = 40.0; % upload rate (file/hour) between Vault B & Client A
mu_b_B = 60.0; % upload rate (file/hour) between Vault B & Client B
mu_b_C = 20.0; % upload rate (file/hour) between Vault B & Client C
mu_c_A = 20.0; % upload rate (file/hour) between Vault C & Client A
mu_c_B = 40.0; % upload rate (file/hour) between Vault C & Client B
mu_c_C = 60.0; % upload rate (file/hour) between Vault C & Client C
nu_A = 0.3; % edit rate (file/hour) of Client A
nu_B = 0.3; % edit rate (file/hour) of Client B
nu_C = 0.3; % edit rate (file/hour) of Client C
theta = 6.0; % retry rate (client/hour)
delta = 100; % signal rate (message/hour)
epsilon = 100; % signal rate (message/hour)
epsilon2 = 200; % (a trick to raise the probability of
epsilon3 = 300; % specific "nondeterministic" choices)
% Client A (Client B and Client C are analogous):
#CA = (CA_TT_cO_s,lambda).CA_1 % successful request for checkOut
+ (CA_TT_cO_f,lambda).CA_2; % failed request for checkOut
#CA_1 = (TT_CA_Va,infty).CA_3_1 % TT assigns Vault A for checkOut
+ (TT_CA_Vb,infty).CA_3_2 % TT assigns Vault B for checkOut
+ (TT_CA_Vc,infty).CA_3_3; % TT assigns Vault C for checkOut
#CA_3_1 = (Va_CA,infty).CA_4; % checkOut file from Vault A
#CA_3_2 = (Vb_CA,infty).CA_4; % checkOut file from Vault B
#CA_3_3 = (Vc_CA,infty).CA_4; % checkOut file from Vault C
#CA_4 = (CA_CA,nu_A).CA_5; % edit file
#CA_5 = (CA_Va_cI,infty).CA % checkIn file in Vault A
+ (CA_Vb_cI,infty).CA % checkIn file in Vault B
+ (CA_Vc_cI,infty).CA; % checkIn file in Vault C
#CA_2 = (CA_TT_cO_s,theta).CA_1 % successful retry of checkOut
+ (CA_TT_cO_f,theta).CA_2; % failed retry of checkOut
% Vault A (Vault B and Vault C are analogous):
#Va = (Va_CA,gamma_a_A).Va % file checkOut by Client A
+ (Va_CB,gamma_a_B).Va % file checkOut by Client B
+ (Va_CC,gamma_a_C).Va % file checkOut by Client C
+ (CA_Va_cI,mu_a_A).Va_1 % file checkIn by Client A
+ (CB_Va_cI,mu_a_B).Va_1 % file checkIn by Client B
+ (CC_Va_cI,mu_a_C).Va_1; % file checkIn by Client C
#Va_1 = (Va_TT,delta).Va; % inform TT of file checkIn
% thinkteam:
#TT = (CA_TT_cO_s,infty).TT_1_1 % grant checkOut to Client A
+ (CB_TT_cO_s,infty).TT_1_2 % grant checkOut to Client B
+ (CC_TT_cO_s,infty).TT_1_3; % grant checkOut to Client C
#TT_1_1 = (TT_CA_Va,epsilon3).TT_2 % assign Vault A to Client A
+ (TT_CA_Vb,epsilon2).TT_2 % assign Vault B to Client A
+ (TT_CA_Vc,epsilon).TT_2; % assign Vault C to Client A
#TT_1_2 = (TT_CB_Va,epsilon).TT_2 % assign Vault A to Client B
+ (TT_CB_Vb,epsilon3).TT_2 % assign Vault B to Client B
+ (TT_CB_Vc,epsilon2).TT_2; % assign Vault C to Client B
#TT_1_3 = (TT_CC_Va,epsilon2).TT_2 % assign Vault A to Client C
+ (TT_CC_Vb,epsilon).TT_2 % assign Vault B to Client C
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+ (TT_CC_Vc,epsilon3).TT_2; % assign Vault C to Client C
#TT_2 = (Va_TT,infty).TT % Vault A signals file checkIn
+ (Vb_TT,infty).TT % Vault B signals file checkIn
+ (Vc_TT,infty).TT % Vault C signals file checkIn
+ (CA_TT_cO_f,infty).TT_2 % deny checkOut to Client A
+ (CB_TT_cO_f,infty).TT_2 % deny checkOut to Client B
+ (CC_TT_cO_f,infty).TT_2; % deny checkOut to Client C
% full specification:
(CA <> CB <> CC) <CA_TT_cO_s,CB_TT_cO_s,CC_TT_cO_s,CA_TT_cO_f,CB_TT_cO_f,CC_TT_cO_f,
TT_CA_Va,TT_CA_Vb,TT_CA_Vc,TT_CB_Va,TT_CB_Vb,TT_CB_Vc,TT_CC_Va,TT_CC_Vb,TT_CC_Vc,
CA_Va_cI,CA_Vb_cI,CA_Vc_cI,CB_Va_cI,CB_Vb_cI,CB_Vc_cI,CC_Va_cI,CC_Vb_cI,CC_Vc_cI,
Va_CA,Va_CB,Va_CC,Vb_CA,Vb_CB,Vb_CC,Vc_CA,Vc_CB,Vc_CC> (TT <Va_TT,Vb_TT,Vc_TT> (Va <> Vb <> Vc))
G. PRISM Speciﬁcation of thinkteam with 3 Users and 3 Vaults
In this appendix the PRISM Speciﬁcation of thinkteam with 3 Users and 3 Vaults discussed in Section 6.2 is given
(Appendix G.1), together with the CSL formulae in the format accepted by PRISM (Appendix G.2).
G.1. PRISMmodel
ctmc
const double lambda = 0.1;
const double gamma_a_A = 60.0;
const double gamma_a_B = 20.0;
const double gamma_a_C = 40.0;
const double gamma_b_A = 40.0;
const double gamma_b_B = 60.0;
const double gamma_b_C = 20.0;
const double gamma_c_A = 20.0;
const double gamma_c_B = 40.0;
const double gamma_c_C = 60.0;
const double mu_a_A = 60.0;
const double mu_a_B = 20.0;
const double mu_a_C = 40.0;
const double mu_b_A = 40.0;
const double mu_b_B = 60.0;
const double mu_b_C = 20.0;
const double mu_c_A = 20.0;
const double mu_c_B = 40.0;
const double mu_c_C = 60.0;
const double nu_A = 0.3;
const double nu_B = 0.3;
const double nu_C = 0.3;
const double theta = 6.0;
const double delta = 100;
const double epsilon = 100;
const double epsilon2 = 200;
const double epsilon3 = 300;
const int CA = 0;
const int CA_1 = 1;
const int CA_2 = 2;
const int CA_3_1 = 3;
const int CA_3_2 = 4;
const int CA_3_3 = 5;
const int CA_4 = 6;
const int CA_5 = 7;
const int CB = 0;
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const int CB_1 = 1;
const int CB_2 = 2;
const int CB_3_1 = 3;
const int CB_3_2 = 4;
const int CB_3_3 = 5;
const int CB_4 = 6;
const int CB_5 = 7;
const int CC = 0;
const int CC_1 = 1;
const int CC_2 = 2;
const int CC_3_1 = 3;
const int CC_3_2 = 4;
const int CC_3_3 = 5;
const int CC_4 = 6;
const int CC_5 = 7;
const int TT = 0;
const int TT_1_1 = 1;
const int TT_1_2 = 2;
const int TT_1_3 = 3;
const int TT_2 = 4;
const int Va = 0;
const int Va_1 = 1;
const int Vb = 0;
const int Vb_1 = 1;
const int Vc = 0;
const int Vc_1 = 1;
module CA
CA_STATE : [0..7] init CA;
[CA_TT_cO_s] (CA_STATE=CA) -> lambda : (CA_STATE’=CA_1);
[CA_TT_cO_f] (CA_STATE=CA) -> lambda : (CA_STATE’=CA_2);
[TT_CA_Va] (CA_STATE=CA_1) -> 1 : (CA_STATE’=CA_3_1);
[TT_CA_Vb] (CA_STATE=CA_1) -> 1 : (CA_STATE’=CA_3_2);
[TT_CA_Vc] (CA_STATE=CA_1) -> 1 : (CA_STATE’=CA_3_3);
[CA_TT_cO_s] (CA_STATE=CA_2) -> theta : (CA_STATE’=CA_1);
[CA_TT_cO_f] (CA_STATE=CA_2) -> theta : (CA_STATE’=CA_2);
[Va_CA] (CA_STATE=CA_3_1) -> 1 : (CA_STATE’=CA_4);
[Vb_CA] (CA_STATE=CA_3_2) -> 1 : (CA_STATE’=CA_4);
[Vc_CA] (CA_STATE=CA_3_3) -> 1 : (CA_STATE’=CA_4);
[CA_CA] (CA_STATE=CA_4) -> nu_A : (CA_STATE’=CA_5);
[CA_Va_cI] (CA_STATE=CA_5) -> 1 : (CA_STATE’=CA);
[CA_Vb_cI] (CA_STATE=CA_5) -> 1 : (CA_STATE’=CA);
[CA_Vc_cI] (CA_STATE=CA_5) -> 1 : (CA_STATE’=CA);
endmodule
module CB
CB_STATE : [0..7] init CB;
[CB_TT_cO_s] (CB_STATE=CB) -> lambda : (CB_STATE’=CB_1);
[CB_TT_cO_f] (CB_STATE=CB) -> lambda : (CB_STATE’=CB_2);
[TT_CB_Va] (CB_STATE=CB_1) -> 1 : (CB_STATE’=CB_3_1);
[TT_CB_Vb] (CB_STATE=CB_1) -> 1 : (CB_STATE’=CB_3_2);
[TT_CB_Vc] (CB_STATE=CB_1) -> 1 : (CB_STATE’=CB_3_3);
[CB_TT_cO_s] (CB_STATE=CB_2) -> theta : (CB_STATE’=CB_1);
[CB_TT_cO_f] (CB_STATE=CB_2) -> theta : (CB_STATE’=CB_2);
[Va_CB] (CB_STATE=CB_3_1) -> 1 : (CB_STATE’=CB_4);
[Vb_CB] (CB_STATE=CB_3_2) -> 1 : (CB_STATE’=CB_4);
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[Vc_CB] (CB_STATE=CB_3_3) -> 1 : (CB_STATE’=CB_4);
[CB_CB] (CB_STATE=CB_4) -> nu_B : (CB_STATE’=CB_5);
[CB_Va_cI] (CB_STATE=CB_5) -> 1 : (CB_STATE’=CB);
[CB_Vb_cI] (CB_STATE=CB_5) -> 1 : (CB_STATE’=CB);
[CB_Vc_cI] (CB_STATE=CB_5) -> 1 : (CB_STATE’=CB);
endmodule
module CC
CC_STATE : [0..7] init CC;
[CC_TT_cO_s] (CC_STATE=CC) -> lambda : (CC_STATE’=CC_1);
[CC_TT_cO_f] (CC_STATE=CC) -> lambda : (CC_STATE’=CC_2);
[TT_CC_Va] (CC_STATE=CC_1) -> 1 : (CC_STATE’=CC_3_1);
[TT_CC_Vb] (CC_STATE=CC_1) -> 1 : (CC_STATE’=CC_3_2);
[TT_CC_Vc] (CC_STATE=CC_1) -> 1 : (CC_STATE’=CC_3_3);
[CC_TT_cO_s] (CC_STATE=CC_2) -> theta : (CC_STATE’=CC_1);
[CC_TT_cO_f] (CC_STATE=CC_2) -> theta : (CC_STATE’=CC_2);
[Va_CC] (CC_STATE=CC_3_1) -> 1 : (CC_STATE’=CC_4);
[Vb_CC] (CC_STATE=CC_3_2) -> 1 : (CC_STATE’=CC_4);
[Vc_CC] (CC_STATE=CC_3_3) -> 1 : (CC_STATE’=CC_4);
[CC_CC] (CC_STATE=CC_4) -> nu_C : (CC_STATE’=CC_5);
[CC_Va_cI] (CC_STATE=CC_5) -> 1 : (CC_STATE’=CC);
[CC_Vb_cI] (CC_STATE=CC_5) -> 1 : (CC_STATE’=CC);
[CC_Vc_cI] (CC_STATE=CC_5) -> 1 : (CC_STATE’=CC);
endmodule
module TT
TT_STATE : [0..4] init TT;
[CA_TT_cO_s] (TT_STATE=TT) -> 1 : (TT_STATE’=TT_1_1);
[CB_TT_cO_s] (TT_STATE=TT) -> 1 : (TT_STATE’=TT_1_2);
[CC_TT_cO_s] (TT_STATE=TT) -> 1 : (TT_STATE’=TT_1_3);
[TT_CA_Va] (TT_STATE=TT_1_1) -> epsilon3 : (TT_STATE’=TT_2);
[TT_CA_Vb] (TT_STATE=TT_1_1) -> epsilon2 : (TT_STATE’=TT_2);
[TT_CA_Vc] (TT_STATE=TT_1_1) -> epsilon : (TT_STATE’=TT_2);
[TT_CB_Va] (TT_STATE=TT_1_2) -> epsilon : (TT_STATE’=TT_2);
[TT_CB_Vb] (TT_STATE=TT_1_2) -> epsilon3 : (TT_STATE’=TT_2);
[TT_CB_Vc] (TT_STATE=TT_1_2) -> epsilon2 : (TT_STATE’=TT_2);
[TT_CC_Va] (TT_STATE=TT_1_3) -> epsilon2 : (TT_STATE’=TT_2);
[TT_CC_Vb] (TT_STATE=TT_1_3) -> epsilon : (TT_STATE’=TT_2);
[TT_CC_Vc] (TT_STATE=TT_1_3) -> epsilon3 : (TT_STATE’=TT_2);
[Va_TT] (TT_STATE=TT_2) -> 1 : (TT_STATE’=TT);
[Vb_TT] (TT_STATE=TT_2) -> 1 : (TT_STATE’=TT);
[Vc_TT] (TT_STATE=TT_2) -> 1 : (TT_STATE’=TT);
[CA_TT_cO_f] (TT_STATE=TT_2) -> 1 : (TT_STATE’=TT_2);
[CB_TT_cO_f] (TT_STATE=TT_2) -> 1 : (TT_STATE’=TT_2);
[CC_TT_cO_f] (TT_STATE=TT_2) -> 1 : (TT_STATE’=TT_2);
endmodule
module Va
Va_STATE : [0..1] init Va;
[Va_CA] (Va_STATE=Va) -> gamma_a_A : (Va_STATE’=Va);
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[Va_CB] (Va_STATE=Va) -> gamma_a_B : (Va_STATE’=Va);
[Va_CC] (Va_STATE=Va) -> gamma_a_C : (Va_STATE’=Va);
[CA_Va_cI] (Va_STATE=Va) -> mu_a_A : (Va_STATE’=Va_1);
[CB_Va_cI] (Va_STATE=Va) -> mu_a_B : (Va_STATE’=Va_1);
[CC_Va_cI] (Va_STATE=Va) -> mu_a_C : (Va_STATE’=Va_1);
[Va_TT] (Va_STATE=Va_1) -> delta : (Va_STATE’=Va);
endmodule
module Vb
Vb_STATE : [0..1] init Vb;
[Vb_CA] (Vb_STATE=Vb) -> gamma_b_A : (Vb_STATE’=Vb);
[Vb_CB] (Vb_STATE=Vb) -> gamma_b_B : (Vb_STATE’=Vb);
[Vb_CC] (Vb_STATE=Vb) -> gamma_b_C : (Vb_STATE’=Vb);
[CA_Vb_cI] (Vb_STATE=Vb) -> mu_b_A : (Vb_STATE’=Vb_1);
[CB_Vb_cI] (Vb_STATE=Vb) -> mu_b_B : (Vb_STATE’=Vb_1);
[CC_Vb_cI] (Vb_STATE=Vb) -> mu_b_C : (Vb_STATE’=Vb_1);
[Vb_TT] (Vb_STATE=Vb_1) -> delta : (Vb_STATE’=Vb);
endmodule
module Vc
Vc_STATE : [0..1] init Vc;
[Vc_CA] (Vc_STATE=Vc) -> gamma_c_A : (Vc_STATE’=Vc);
[Vc_CB] (Vc_STATE=Vc) -> gamma_c_B : (Vc_STATE’=Vc);
[Vc_CC] (Vc_STATE=Vc) -> gamma_c_C : (Vc_STATE’=Vc);
[CA_Vc_cI] (Vc_STATE=Vc) -> mu_c_A : (Vc_STATE’=Vc_1);
[CB_Vc_cI] (Vc_STATE=Vc) -> mu_c_B : (Vc_STATE’=Vc_1);
[CC_Vc_cI] (Vc_STATE=Vc) -> mu_c_C : (Vc_STATE’=Vc_1);
[Vc_TT] (Vc_STATE=Vc_1) -> delta : (Vc_STATE’=Vc);
endmodule
G.2. PRISM CSL formulae
%Formula P1
P>=1([true U CA_STATE=CA_5 {CA_STATE=CA_3_1}])
%Formula P2
P<=0([true U ((CA_STATE=CA_1) & (CB_STATE=CB_1)) |
((CA_STATE=CA_1) & (CC_STATE=CC_1)) |
((CB_STATE=CB_1) & (CC_STATE=CC_1))
])
%Formula P3
P=?([true U<=5 CA_STATE=CA_5 {CA_STATE=CA_3_1}])
%Formula P4
S=?([CA_STATE=CA_2 ])
H. Additional Reward Structures of PRISM Speciﬁcation
rewards "NrSuccessfulRequestsClientA"
[CA_TT_cO_s] true : 1;
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endrewards
rewards "NrFailedRequestsClientA"
[CA_TT_cO_f] true : 1;
endrewards
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